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[DIS-]INFORMING THE PEOPLE’S
DISCRETION: JUDICIAL DEFERENCE UNDER
THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTION OF
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
SUSAN NEVELOW MART AND TOM GINSBURG 
I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the
people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise
their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from
them, but to inform their discretion. . .
—Thomas Jefferson1
[what] I deem the essential principles of our Government, and consequently
those which ought to shape its Administration. . . [includes] the diffusion of
information and arraignment of all abuses at the bar of public reason. . .
—Thomas Jefferson2
I think it’s clear that some of the conversations [Snowden] has generated,

 Respectively, Associate Professor and Director of the Law Library, University of Colorado
Law School, Boulder, Colorado and Leo Spitz Professor of International Law, University of
Chicago, and Research Professor, American Bar Foundation. The authors thank Jennifer
Nou and Nicholas Stephanopolous for helpful comments, along with colleagues at Colorado
Law for their insightful review of this paper at Colorado Law’s Works-in-Progress series,
particularly Sarah Krakoff, Helen Norton, Amy Schmitz, and Ahmed White, and colleagues
at the Duke/University of North Carolina Workshop for Scholarship on Legal Information
and Information Law and Policy, April 4-5, 2013, especially Lolly Gasaway and Guangya Liu.
Special thanks go to Dr. Jeffrey T. Luftig, Lockheed Martin Professor of Management &
Program Director, University of Colorado Engineering Management Program, for his help in
designing the coding for the statistical analysis. The authors thank Emily Heasley and
Rochelle Laxamana for excellent research assistance.
1. LETTER FROM THOMAS JEFFERSON TO WILLIAM CHARLES JARVIS (Sept. 28, 1820)
reprinted in 10 THE WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON, 161 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed., New York, G.P.
Putnam Sons 1899).
2. THOMAS JEFFERSON, FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS AT WASHINGTON, D.C. (Mar. 4,
1801), reprinted in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 540, at 13 (1952).
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some of the debate, actually needed to happen. . . If there’s a good side to
this, maybe that’s it.
—James Clapper3

Abstract
As noted by President Obama’s recent Review Group on Intelligence
and Communications Technologies, pervasive state surveillance has never
been more feasible. There has been an inexorable rise in the size and
reach of the national security bureaucracy since it was created after World
War II, as we have gone through the Cold War and the War on Terror. No
one doubts that our national security bureaucracies need to gain
intelligence and keep some of it secret. But the consensus of decades of
experts, both insiders and outsiders, is that there is rampant
overclassification by government agencies. From its inception in 1966, the
Freedom of Information Act has presumed disclosure. And from its
inception, Congress intended the federal courts to act as a brake on
unfettered agency discretion regarding classification. But courts have not
played a strong role in this regard. This article examines the interplay of
overclassification, excessive judicial deference, and illusory agency
expertise in the context of the national security exemption to the Freedom
of Information Act.
The national security exemption allows documents to be withheld that
are “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive
Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy”
and that “are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive
Order.” The history of national security classification and the passage of
the FOIA illuminate the tension between legislative demands for
transparency and the growth of the national security state with its agency
culture of secrecy. That tension has generally been resolved by the courts
in favor of secrecy, despite agreement that there is rampant
overclassification and pseudo-classification (labeling documents as
sensitive but unclassified). This deference in turn leads agencies routinely
deny FOIA requests that should in fact be granted. Without adequate court
oversight, there is no agency incentive to comply with the FOIA’s
presumption of disclosure.
We argue that courts have been systematically ignoring their clear
legislative mandate. Although the government is entitled to substantial
3. Ken Dilanian, Clapper: Snowden Case Brings Healthy Debate; More Disclosures to
Come, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/12/world/la-fg-wnclapper-snowden-disclosures-20130912.
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deference, the role of the judiciary is not to rubber stamp claims of
national security, but to undertake de novo and in camera review of
government claims that the information requested was both required to be
kept secret and properly classified. Congress amended the FOIA in 1974
to make this requirement explicit, overruling a judicial attempt to defer
completely to government claims that national security classifications are
proper.
There are many reasons that courts are reluctant to get involved in
determining the validity of exemption claims based on national security.
Overestimation of risk may be one reason, as is fear of the consequences of
error. We also discuss a “secrecy heuristic” whereby people attribute
greater accuracy to “secret” documents.
Notwithstanding these
rationales, courts have, in other contexts, wrestled successfully with the
conflict between national security and paramount rights, such as those
found in the first and fourth amendments. Courts have the institutional
expertise to review claims of national security, if they choose to exercise it.
Our conclusion is that the systematic failures of the federal courts in the
FOIA context are neither inevitable nor justified. We show that courts do
occasionally order the release of some documents. This article includes
the first empirical investigation into the decisionmaking of the D.C. district
courts and federal circuit courts in cases involving the national security
exemption to determine what, if any, factors favor document release. We
find that party characteristics are the biggest predictor of disclosure. We
also show that, while politics do not seem to matter at most courts, they do
at the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, at which Republican-dominated
panels have never ordered disclosure.
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2012, Richard W. Roberts, a district court judge in the
District of Columbia, issued a headline-making order in a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA)4 case: the court held that the office of the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) had failed, after multiple
opportunities, to justify withholding a position paper under the first
exemption to the FOIA.5 This exemption, so-called “Exemption One”,
allows agencies to withhold documents that are “specifically authorized
under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy” and that “are in fact properly
classified pursuant to such Executive Order.”6 Judge Roberts did what few
judges have done: asking whether the document in question was “in fact
properly classified,” concluded that it was not, and ordered disclosure.7
5 U.S.C. § 552. This statute was enacted on July 4, 1966, and provides that any
person may obtain access to federal agency records, unless the record is protected from
disclosure by a specific exemption. See generally http://www.foia.gov/about.html [last accessed
Oct. 3, 2015].
5. Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law v. Office of the United States Trade Representative (CIEL
III), 845 F. Supp. 2d 252 (D.D.C. 2012).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2012).
7. CIEL III, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 256. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, CIEL III,
845 F. Supp. 2d 252 (2012) (No. 12-5136) (showing that the government appealed the order
and that oral arguments were heard on February 21, 2013). See id at 4 (showing that Judge
Roberts did not review the document in question in camera). But see Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law
4
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The national security exemption of the FOIA embodies what is arguably
the most important issue in American governance today: the need to
balance transparency with security. As the recent report of President
Obama’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies
discusses, we live in a surveillance state, and the rationale for that state is
national security.8 Yet our legal tradition is one that values transparency,
as exemplified by the FOIA. FOIA requires courts to protect transparency,
but judges have been reluctant to grapple directly with a claim by the
government that a document is classified and may be withheld from a
FOIA requester.9
As we demonstrate below, plaintiffs rarely win FOIA cases when the
Government invokes the national security and foreign affairs exemption.
By our account, only 5% of such cases will result in an outright win for a
plaintiff, and fewer than one in five cases lead to even partial disclosure.
Disclosure has become even rarer after 9/11: only two of sixty one cases
have led to full disclosure since 2001.10 Why are courts so reluctant to
order disclosure in Exemption One cases? This article examines
Exemption One in light of its historical context, the legislative and judicial
ballet over the appropriate level of deference to the executive, and the role
of overclassification and pseudo-classification.11 The latter refers to the
phenomenon that agencies have generated their own schemes for
categorizing sensitive information, even when not authorized to do so by
statute. In the absence of a review agency, these schemes vary wildly

v. Office of the United States Trade Representative (CIEL IV), 718 F.3d 899, 904 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (showing that Judge Robert’s decision was overturned).
8. See Liberty and Security in a Changing World, Report and Recommendations of
the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies 1, 96 (Dec.
12,
2013),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-1212_rg_final_report.pdf.
9. See analyses infra Parts III. & V.
10. See infra Part VI.
11. See Dubin v. United States, 363 F.2d 938, 942 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (explaining, in its
discussion of radar laws, that overclassification is somewhat self-explanatory: it is excessive
classification, but performed pursuant to a classification scheme laid out by statute or
Executive Order). See also Reducing Overclassification Act, Pub. L. No. 111-258 (2010)
(requiring the Department of Homeland Security to develop a strategy to prevent the
overclassification of homeland security information and to promote homeland security
information sharing with state, local, tribal, and private sector entities, but failing to define
overclassification); Rick Blum, Secrecy Report Card 2005, 9, OPENTHEGOVERNMENT.ORG,
http://www.openthegovernment.org/otg/SRC2005.pdf (2005) (explaining that pseudoclassification is the practice of labeling documents with such terms as “sensitive but
unclassified.” (SBU), and that unlike classified documents, there are no consistent rules about
what constitutes a document that is being “pseudo-classified”). Some other examples include
Sensitive Security Information (SSI), For Official Use Only (FOUO), and Controlled
Unclassified Information (CUI).
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across agencies.12.
We evaluate the national security community’s
estimations of agency expertise and motivation in classifying national
security matters, and argue that a pattern of overclassification and pseudoclassification has produced agency denial of FOIA requests that should in
fact be granted.
Originally passed in 1966, FOIA was the culmination of a number of
attempts to increase agency openness and prevent secrecy. But since then,
the evolution of the law on agency classification of documents has not been
favorable to requesters. In 1974, Congress passed an amendment to
FOIA granting judicial authority to conduct de novo and in camera reviews
of government claims that information was authorized under an Executive
Order to be kept secret and that the information was in fact properly
classified. The amendment was meant to override the Supreme Court
decision in EPA v. Mink,13 which held that an agency’s claim of
withholding documents based on the national defense or foreign policy
exemptions of the FOIA could be sustained solely on the basis of an
affidavit from the government that the materials were properly classified.
During Congressional discussions of the amendment, legislators stated that
courts should review agency classification determinations. However, the
legislators decided that because of agency expertise and experience, the
agency could give substantial weight to agency classification
determinations. Since 1974, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the busiest
court in FOIA cases, has generally declined to take an active role in
oversight of agency assertions of national security classification.14 But not
always.
This Article revisits the concept of “agency expertise” in national
security matters. We suggest that there is overwhelming evidence that
agencies do in fact overclassify documents, and that the motivation for
classification arises from an agency culture of secrecy. Agencies
sometimes seek to legitimate the superior value of information by
designating it as “secret”. They also use classification to prevent the
exposure of embarrassing and politically volatile information that has no
national security value.15 At the same time, the very concept of national
A report issued by a presidential Task Force in 2009 found there were 119 versions
of the CUI designation in use. See generally Controlled Unclassified Information, Exec.
Order No. 13,556, 75 F.R. § 68675 (2010) (stating that “appropriate consideration should be
given to the report of the interagency Task Force on Controlled Unclassified Information
published in August 2009”).
13. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
14. Margaret B. Kwoka, The Freedom of Information Act Trial, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 217,
261 (2011) (examining the likelihood of a FOIA case going trial).
15. SEE, E.G., SCOTT SHANE, COMPLAINT SEEKS PUNISHMENT FOR CLASSIFICATION OF
DOCUMENTS,
N.Y.
Times,
AUG.
1,
2011,
AVAILABLE
AT
12
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security has been expanding since 9/11, with public discourse focusing on a
state of war, in which the next attack is imminent. Cognitive psychology
suggests that in such circumstances people overestimate risks, further
tilting decision making towards secrecy and against civil liberties and
transparency.16
To illuminate how the courts have balanced national security and civil
liberties, this article includes an empirical investigation into the
decisionmaking of the D.C. Circuit and identifies the circumstances in
which a FOIA requestor is more likely to get some or all disputed
documents that have been withheld pursuant to the national security or
foreign policy exemption. Besides providing some insight for FOIA
litigators, the analysis has important implications for the perennial efforts
to address national security concerns in an open and democratic society.
Legislative efforts in this regard must take into account judicial reticence to
police national security matters, and can do so by encouraging a structured,
step-by-step inquiry into agency action.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Part II frames the
issue by discussing a recent headline-making FOIA case involving
Exemption One, then recounts the social and political trends that produced
the FOIA and examines how the statute evolved regarding judicial review
of claims of exemptions based on national security or foreign affairs. Part
III discusses judicial reluctance to review agency decisions and its possible
causes. Part IV then reviews the problems of overclassification and the
illusion of agency expertise. Part V presents an empirical study of the
FOIA decisions of the D.C. District court and the Circuit courts of appeal.
Part VI discusses the confluence of the national security narrative and the
transparency narrative. Part VII concludes.
I. THE FOIA AND POLITICAL TRENDS IN THE EVOLUTION
OF EXEMPTION ONE
A. CIEL v. USTR: The Exception that (Almost) Proved the Rule
The Center for International Environmental Law v. USTR case,
described at the outset of this Article, provides a useful introduction to the
issues involved in classification and FOIA. In that case, the district court
HTTP://WWW.NYTIMES.COM/2011/08/02/US/02SECRET.HTML?_R=0

(discussing
how
overclassification is rampant).
16. See Oren Gross, Security v. Liberty: On Emotions and Cognition, in THE LONG
DECADE: HOW 9/11 HAS CHANGED THE LAW (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3-21), Oxford
University Press, 2012, Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-4 (noting that people
“tend to link their assessment of the probability of an occurrence of a particular event to their
ability to imagine similar events taking place”).
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took the unusual step of rejecting an agency’s conclusory declaration that
documents involving international trade negotiations might cause harm to
the United States negotiating efforts and asked whether the documents
were properly classified.17 After the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) tried three times to justify the classification, the
court rejected the classification and ordered USTR to turn over the
documents. Until the final appellate court review, this case was an unusual
victory for FOIA requestors. Even when a court takes the unusual step of
demanding substantial justification for agency classification decisions, the
ultimate result can still be denial: this is precisely what happened in a case
involving a FOIA request for videos of four prisoners in Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base.18 The procedural complexity of the case is itself an indication
of the difficulties FOIA requesters face.
The Center for International Environmental Law19 (CIEL) case began
when CIEL filed a FOIA request for documents relating to sessions of the
Negotiating Group on Investment (NGI) for the Free Trade Agreement of
the Americas (FTAA).20 During the negotiations, the USTR gave
documents containing the attending foreign governments’ proposed text
and commentary for the investment portion of the FTAA to the negotiators.
Although the USTR identified forty-six documents in its office responsive
to CIEL’s request, the USTR withheld all forty-six documents, citing the
deliberative process exemption to the FOIA.21
In 2001, CIEL filed suit and moved for production of a Vaughn Index.22
17. Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 505 F.
Supp. 2d 150, 159 (D.D.C. 2007) [CIEL I]. See also Classified National Security
Information, Exec. Order No. 12958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825, 19,826.1.2(a)(4) (April 20, 1995)
(stating that documents are only properly classified if “the original classification authority
determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected
to result in damage to national security and the original classification authority is able to
identify or describe the damage”).
18. INT’L COUNSEL BUREAU V. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF DEF. (ICB V. DOD IV), 906
F.SUPP.2D 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2012).
19. CIEL is a non-profit public interest organization concerned with the impact of trade
policy
on
the
environment.
See
Who
We
Are,
CIEL.ORG,
http://www.ciel.org/About_Us/index.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2014).
20. CIEL I,, 505 F. Supp. 2d, at 153.
21. Id. at 154 (citing to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)).
22. Complaint, CIEL I (D.D.C. 2001) (No. 1:01-cv-00498-RWR), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/ciel/111612-appendix.pdf. A Vaughn Index is an itemized list of
justifications for FOIA withholdings prepared by government agencies in the context of FOIA
litigation. A court may require an agency to produce a Vaughn Index on its own motion, or a
plaintiff may petition the court to do so. The decision to order production is left to the
discretion of the court. Agencies are not required to produce Vaughn Indexes when the
release of information included in the index would allow the requester to deduce the general
content of the undisclosed material or when the agency is not required under FOIA to
confirm or deny that it possesses particular materials. FOIA requesters may not compel
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During the course of the proceedings, the parties agreed that forty-one of
the documents were properly covered by the deliberative process
exemption. Only four of the documents remained in dispute. At that point
in the litigation, for the first time, the USTR claimed that Exemption One
protected the four documents, as they concerned national security or
foreign affairs.23 In 2007, Judge Roberts ruled that the agency’s
declaration was inadequate to establish that Exemption One covered the
documents. Then, at the request of the USTR, the countries negotiating the
FTAA derestricted three of the documents, which were released to CIEL.24
The USTR did not ask for the fourth document to be derestricted.25
Now only one document remained in dispute. The document explains
the United States’ initial proposed negotiating position on the meaning of
“in like circumstances,” which “defines the conditions under which the
national treatment and most-favored-nation rules apply.”26 Judge Roberts
again rejected the USTR’s declarations, finding that the USTR’s
inconsistent positions on the harm that might be caused “should not provide
the basis for withholding a document. Such inconsistency is an indication
of unreliability, and the agency affidavits will be shown no deference with
respect to any justification for withholding that involves maintaining trust
of negotiating partners.”27 Submitting further affidavits, the USTR brought
a third summary judgment motion but failed to convince Judge Roberts.28
agencies to produce Vaughn Indices during the administrative process, though agencies may
voluntarily do so. Vaughn Indices must include three types of information: (1) identification
of each document being withheld; (2) the relevant statutory exemption for each document;
and (3) an explanation detailing how the disclosure of the document would impair the
interests safeguarded by the statutory exemption. Citizens Comm’n on Human Rights v.
FDA, 45 F.3d 1325, n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). As the Vaughn court explained, the requirements set
forth by the court serve two main purposes: (1) to ensure “part[ies’] right to information” and
(2) to allow “the court system effectively and efficiently to evaluate the factual nature of
disputed information.” Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826 (D.C.Cir. 1973). Procedurally,
the Vaughn Index has been a substitute for discovery in FOIA litigation; discovery orders are
very rare. See Kwoka, The Freedom of Information Act Trial, supra note 13 at 235.
23. See Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law v. Office of the United States Trade Representative
(CIEL I), 505 F. Supp. 2d 150, 154 (D.D.C. 2007).
24. Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law v. Office of the United States Trade Representative (CIEL
II), 777 F. Supp. 2d 77, 80 (D.D.C. 2011).
25. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12-13, Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law v. Office of the
United States Trade Representative, (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-5136), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/ciel/oralarg.pdf.
26. Brief for Office of the United States Trade Representative, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellants at 40, Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law v. Office of the United States Trade
Representative,
No.
12-5136
(D.D.C.
Sept.
17,
2012)
available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/ciel/091712-app.pdf. See id. at 8 (describing the document in
question).
27. CIEL II, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 79.
28. See Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law v. Office of the United States Trade Representative
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The USTR was ordered to turn over the document, having failed to show
that classification of the document was proper under the criteria set out in
the relevant Executive Order.29 Judge Roberts had never seen the
document.30
The USTR appealed Judge Roberts’ decision, and oral arguments were
held before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals on February 21, 2013.31 On
June 7, 2013, the D.C. Circuit reversed Judge Roberts, preventing
disclosure.32 “Courts,” it noted, “are ‘in an extremely poor position to
second-guess’ the Trade Representative’s predictive judgment in these
matters . . . but that is just what the district court did in rejecting the
agency’s justification for withholding the white paper.”33 Similar to many
cases before it, the Government was able to keep the document As in so
many other previous cases, the Government was able in the end to keep a
document secret, on the basis of a generalized judicial invocation of
institutional incapacity.
B. The Evolution of the Disclosure Regime
What made Judge Roberts’ decision so noteworthy is that it followed the
Congressional mandate to hold the government to the standards of proper
classification and disclosure the FOIA was passed to implement. Few
courts have done so,34 despite the original language of the FOIA and the
clarification Congress passed when courts failed to follow that mandate.35
This section traces the history and motive of Exemption One, and argues
that understanding the political context of the FOIA’s passage helps to
illuminate the deep tensions.
One tendency of bureaucracies is to maintain secrecy—about any
information—not just potentially classifiable information: as Max Weber

(CIEL III), 845 F. Supp. 2d 252, 253, 259 (D.D.C. 2012) (explaining that Judge Roberts
found that the document was a non-binding starting point for negotiation that could be revised
or withdrawn at any time, so disclosure could not damage the United States foreign relations
by reducing future flexibility, nor could withholding the non-binding document preserve the
United States’ negotiating capital).
29. Id. at 257.
30. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law v. Office of the
United States Trade Representative, 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-5136) available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/ciel/oralarg.pdf.
31. Id. at 1, 4–6.
32. Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law v. Office of the United States Trade Representative (CIEL
IV), 718 F.3d 899, 904 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
33. Id. at 902 (quoting Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 865 (D.C. Cir.2009)).
See Section IV, infra at XXX.
The 1974 amendments to the FOIA’s national security exemption were expressly
directed at the court’s decision in Mink v. EPA, 410 U.S. 73, 101 (1973). See page 14, infra.
34
35
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wrote in 1920, “Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the
professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret.
Bureaucratic administration tends to be an administration of ‘secret
sessions’ in so far as it can, it hides its knowledge and actions from
criticism . . .”36 That tendency was first addressed in the United States by
the introduction of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946. 37
The APA reflected a political compromise between proponents of
bureaucratic discretion and opponents of the administrative state, who
valued judicial review as a means of ensuring accountability.38 The
requirement that agencies disclose information was one of the APA’s most
important provisions, as the 1966 House Report on the reform of the APA
noted:
[M]ost important it required ‘agencies to keep the public currently informed
of their organization, procedures, and rules.’
The intent of
the public information section of the Administrative Procedure Act (sec. 3)
was set forth clearly by the Judiciary Committee, in reporting the measure to
the Senate. The report declares that the public information provisions—are
in many ways among the most important, far-reaching, and useful
provisions.39

The original exemptions to section 3 of the APA were so broad that
agencies used them as an excuse for secrecy, and the abuses pushed the call
for reform.40 The piecemeal attempts at reforming the APA were
unsuccessful in overcoming federal agencies’ disinclination to release
information.41 During the time that Congress was tinkering with the APA,
there was a separate movement to pass a comprehensive Freedom of
Information law.42 This was part of a global trend to adopt such laws

36. MAX WEBER, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 233 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds.,
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1958) (1946).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (2000). For a thorough history of attempts to reform
administrative law prior to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), see generally George B.
Shepard, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From the New
Deal, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996).
38. See generally Martin Shapiro, The APA: Past, Present and Future, 72 VA. L REV.
447, 452-454 (describing the compromise).
39. H.R. REP. NO. 89–1497, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2420 (1966).
40. FOERSTEL, supra note 32, at 10–28; see also S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965)(“After
it became apparent that section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act was being used as an
excuse for secrecy, proposals for change began.”).
41. FOERSTEL, supra note 32, at 39–40.
42. ALAN B. LEVENSON & HARVEY L. PITT, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION: FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT, SUNSHINE ACT, PRIVACY ACT 69–70 (1978). News media groups had
worked for ten years to get a Freedom of Information Act passed. Id.
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beginning in the 1960s.43 The history of legislation attempting to deal with,
among other things, the failure of agencies to produce documents when
requested, must be understood in light of the history of legislation creating
agencies whose charge required secrecy.
The period in which the APA and a national freedom of information law
were being debated coincided with the creation of the post-World War II
national security bureaucracy. The institution of permanent agencies
whose job it is to collect and keep secrets does not actually go that far back
in American history. Before World War II, intelligence units existed only
during wars; when the wars were over, so was the need for the intelligence
bureaucracy.44 But when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, everything
changed; Pearl Harbor was perceived in part as an intelligence failure
driven by excessive concern for secrecy.45
After the end of the war, the creation of permanent intelligence agencies
was intended to, among other things, allow for the central collection and
study of foreign intelligence.46 This led to the establishment of the Central
Intelligence Agency for foreign intelligence,47 while the Federal Bureau of

43. Jeannine Relly, Freedom of Information Laws and Global Diffusion: Testing
Rogers’ Model, 89 JOURNALISM & MASS COMMUNICATION Q. 433 (2012) (looking at
diffusion of countries adopting freedom of information laws in relation to news media).
44. FRANK J. SMIST, JR., CONGRESS OVERSEES THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY, 1947-1994, at 2 (1994) (“Prior to World War II, intelligence was an issue
primarily during wartime. There are few examples of intelligence during peacetime. . . . Up
until World War II, the United States created military intelligence units only during major
conflicts such as the Civil War and World War I. After hostilities ended, most of these units
were downgraded and deemphasized.”).
45. Id. The intelligence failure—the failure to share information with other parts of the
intelligence community in the name of bureaucratic secrecy—was on the same scale and of the
same kind, interestingly, as the 9/11 intelligence failure. “Prior to this attack, American
intelligence had broken the Japanese diplomatic cipher and had intercepted and deciphered
messages that gave clear and definite indications that the Japanese intended to attack Pearl
Harbor. Unfortunately, because of the fragmented nature of American intelligence, key
Japanese messages were not decrypted in a timely fashion, and the most important intelligence
was disseminated slowly to key policy makers in Washington and never disseminated to the
military commanders in Hawaii. Consequently, Pearl Harbor is best described as an
“intelligence failure.” Id. See also Patricia Sullivan, Roberta M. Wohlstetter; Military
Intelligence
Expert,
WASH.
POST,
Jan.
10.
2007,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/09/AR2007010901741.html;
THE NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 247, 276, 541 n. 107 (2004). The government tried to suppress discussion of the
issue by suppressing the publication of a book detailing the nature of the failure for five years.
Failure of intelligence dissemination was a component of the intelligence failure that led to the
9/11 attacks.
46. SMIST, supra note 41, at 2–3. That, of course, is not how the story played out: the
American intelligence community resembles a collection of independent fiefdoms. Id. at 4.
47. National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C.A. § 3001 (1947).
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Investigation remained responsible for domestic intelligence.48 However,
the new agency remained highly secretive, despite the lessons of Pearl
Harbor.49 Sadly, excessive secrecy within intelligence communities has
remained a systemic problem.50
It was within this framework of newly institutionalized secrecy that the
FOIA was passed in 1966, although President Johnson disapproved of the
law.51 As a statutory framework for protection of access to government
information, FOIA defined the agency records that were subject to
disclosure, set up a rebuttable presumption of mandatory disclosure, and
granted nine exemptions.52 The national security exemption is exemption
one.53 In light of the importance of the national security bureaucracies, it
was no surprise that the exemption for national security was the first
exemption to the FOIA, occupying a symbolically central place in the
legislation. The original national security exemption to FOIA stated that:
“This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the
extent that there is involved—(1) a function of the United States requiring
secrecy in the public interest.”54 This section was quickly revised to
require that to be exempt from disclosure, the classification of documents

48. Athan G. Theoharis, A Brief History of the FBI and Its Powers, in THE FBI: A
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE 20 (Athan G. Theoharis et al. eds., 1999). The FBI was
first an administrative creation; it started in 1908 and was given full statutory authority in 1935.
Id. at 3–6, 14.
49. SMIST, supra note 43, at 2. Key documents were never sent to military commanders
in Hawai’i. Id.
50. Id. See also THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 43. The 9/11 Commission
Report’s findings regarding excessive overclassification have been incorporated in the
Reducing Overclassification Act (P.L. 111-258, codified at various sections of the United
States Code) which sets out in its findings that “[t]he National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States (commonly known as the ‘9/11 Commission’) concluded that
security requirements nurture overclassification . . . . The 9/11 Commission and others have
observed that the overclassification of information interferes with accurate, actionable, and
timely information sharing, increases the cost of information security, and needlessly limits
stakeholder and public access to information.”
51. Thomas Blanton, Freedom of Information at 40, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ARCHIVE
(2006),
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194/index.htm.
“Documents from the LBJ Library show that the normally gregarious President, who loved
handing out pens at bill signings, refused even to hold a formal ceremony for the FOIA,
personally removed strong openness language from the press statement, and only agreed to
approve the bill after the Justice Department suggested the tactic that has become President
Bush’s favorite—a signing statement that undercut the thrust of the law.” Id.
52. The exemptions are listed in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000).
53. Id. The text of the exemption reads in full: (b) This section does not apply to
matters that are—(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact
properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.
54. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (Supp. 1966), Pub. L. No. 89–554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 383.
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had to be done pursuant to an Executive Order.55
The early amendment codified the judicial authority to conduct a de
novo review: if the records were improperly withheld, “the court shall
determine the matter de novo and the burden shall be on the agency to
sustain its action.”56 The Supreme Court has held that the nine
“exemptions are specifically made exclusive . . . and must be narrowly
construed.”57
Despite the mandate that all of the FOIA exemptions be narrowly
construed, courts interpreting Exemption One have not done so. Classified
and pseudo-classified documents began to occupy a special niche in the
FOIA practice. Even though the FOIA “rejected the traditional rule of
deference” to agency expertise in reviewing an agency’s FOIA
determination,58 courts routinely granted deference to an agency
determination that a document was properly classified and therefore
exempt from FOIA.59 The tendency of courts to defer to agencies on
national security matters reached its crescendo in EPA v. Mink.60 In Mink,
members of Congress sued under the FOIA to get information about an
underground atomic explosion. Mink held that an agency’s claim that
documents were not subject to a FOIA request because they qualified for
the national security or foreign policy exemptions to the FOIA could be
sustained solely on the basis of a government affidavit that the documents
were properly classified.61 The court was not allowed to review the
documents and see if a portion of the documents could be released.62 The
concurrence by Justice Stewart blamed Congress for imposing such a
stringent form of deference, noting that disclosure about hotly contested
55. Exempted were documents “specifically required by Executive order to be kept
secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1) (Supp.
IV 1969). Agencies do not have to claim an exemption; they have the discretion to release the
information where no harm would result from the disclosure. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281, 293 (1979) (explaining that agency’s need or preference for confidentiality is not a
mandatory bar to disclosure).
56. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(3) (Supp. IV 1969).
57. Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (addressing law students
who sought to compel the Air Force to disclose summaries of honors and ethics hearings
under pseudonyms).
58. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 101 (1973).
59. This kind of deference is not consistent with “a proper understanding of FOIA or
the constitutional ‘right to know.’” Barry Sullivan, FOIA and the First Amendment:
Representative Democracy and the People’s Elusive “Right to Know,” 72 MARYLAND L. REV.
1, 70 (2012) (discussing the failure to consider the Constitutional underpinnings of the FOIA).
60. Mink, 410 U.S. at 84. Justice Stewart’s position requires looking at the documents
and segregating the parts that could and that could not be disclosed; that was what the court of
appeals had ordered. Id. at 78.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 93.
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nuclear tests were just the sort of information that should be disclosed
“consistent with legitimate interests of national defense.”63 In Mink,
Justices Brennan and Marshall wrote an eloquent dissent on what they
believed was the clear legislative intent of Congress:
We have the word of both Houses of Congress that the de novo proceeding
requirement was enacted expressly “in order that the ultimate decision as to
the propriety of the agency’s action is made by the court and prevent it from
becoming meaningless judicial sanctioning of agency discretion” . . . And to
underscore its meaning, Congress rejected the traditional rule of deference to
administrative determinations by “[p]lacing the burden of proof upon the
agency” to justify the withholding . . . The Court’s rejection of the Court of
Appeals’ construction is inexplicable in the face of this overwhelming
evidence of the congressional design (citations omitted) (italics added).64

Mink mandated rubber-stamping agency determinations despite what the
dissent felt was clear congressional intent, and Congress reacted by
legislatively overruling Mink in the 1974 amendments to the FOIA.65 The
broader context for the congressional discussion about balancing national
security and the access to information necessary for a functioning
democracy was a general concern about overclassification in the
burgeoning national security bureaucracy.”66 In 1971, the chair of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William Fulbright, was already
complaining that “secrecy . . . has become a kind of god in this country.67
Even though the FOIA was originally passed in 1966, by 1972, the
overclassification problem required a new executive order. When
President Nixon signed Executive Order 11652 on classification, in 1972,
he had this to say about overclassification:

63. Id. at 94.
64. Id. at 100–101.
65. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 93502, 88 Stat. 1561.
66. VICTOR MARCHETTI & JOHN D. MARKS, THE CIA AND THE CULT OF
INTELLIGENCE 11 (1974) (discussing the CIA’s original purpose “as a coordinating agency
responsible for gathering, evaluating, and preparing foreign intelligence of use to policymakers” and its subsequent actions away from the original purpose).
PHILIP H. MELANSON, SECRECY WARS: NATONAL SECURITY, PRIVACY AND THE
PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW 9 (2002)
67
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Unfortunately, the system of classification which has evolved in the United
States has failed to meet the standards of an open and democratic society,
allowing too many papers to be classified for too long a time. The controls
which have been imposed on classification authority have proved
unworkable, and classification has frequently served to conceal bureaucratic
mistakes or to prevent embarrassment to officials and administrations
(emphasis added).68

However, it was the Nixon administration’s actions that created a tipping
point against unfettered executive secrecy. The political upheaval caused
by Vietnam and the Watergate break-in eroded congressional trust in the
executive branch and set the stage for the creation of a special committee
for intelligence oversight.69 Early in 1975, the Senate appointed Frank
Church to investigate and make recommendations about intelligence
improprieties70 and the House appointed Representative Otis Pike to head a
similar committee.71
The Church Committee’s investigations of intelligence agency
operations resulted in fourteen reports, issued in 1975 and 1976.72 In the
Church Reports, newspaper accounts of CIA surveillance within the United
68. Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material,
Exec. Order No. 11,652, 37 F.R. § 5209 (1972); Richard M. Nixon, Statement on

Establishing a New System for Classification and Declassification of Government Documents
Relating to National Security, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, Mar. 8, 1972,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3762. Although Nixon openly discussed
excessive classification when signing the Executive Order, the Executive Order itself expanded
the range of documents exempted under Exemption One of the FOIA: “interests of national
defense” was changed to “interests of national security and foreign relations.” See Harold C.
Relyea, Opening Government to Public Scrutiny: A Decade of Efforts, 35 PUBLIC ADMIN.
REV. 3, 6 (1975) (comparing Executive Order 10,501 to Executive Order 11,652, and
discussing the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee’s elevenpoint criticism of President Nixon’s Executive Order).
69. SMIST, supra note 41, at 9–10.
70. Id. at 10; Senate Committee on Government Operations, Legislative Proposals to

Strengthen Congressional Oversight of the Nation’s Intelligence Agencies: Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on Government
Operations, 93d Cong. 20–21 (1974).
71. The Pike Committee was not successful; its final report was repudiated by the
members of the House of Representatives on January 29, 1976. SMIST, supra note 41, at 10;
122 CONG. REC. 1641 (1976). The committee report was leaked to the press. SMIST, supra
note 41, at 10–11.
72. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976) (contains six books);
SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES, INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. NO. 94-465 (1975); SELECT COMM. TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, HEARINGS, S.
RES. 21, 94th Cong. (1974) (contains seven volumes), available at ASSASSINATION ARCHIVES
& RESEARCH CTR., CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS (1976) [hereinafter the Church Reports],
http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/contents.htm, providing links to all fourteen
reports.
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States were confirmed, documenting that the CIA had opened and
photographed hundreds of thousands of pieces of first class mail to and
from U.S. citizens, creating a database holding 1.5 million names, known
as CHAOS.73 The National Security Agency had a private arrangement
with three American telegraph companies, which gave millions of private
telegraphs to the Agency from 1947 to 1975.74 The Church Reports also
validated reports of covert actions of the United States government,
manipulating elections,75 and attempting assassinations in Chile, Cuba, and
the Congo.76
After working for two years to expose the illegalities that had been
obscured by government secrecy, members of the Church Committee came
down firmly on the side of openness: “In almost every case where liberty
was sacrificed to obtain a measure of security, the sacrifice turned out to be
unnecessary and ineffective.”77 Senator Hart said that “[a]s Americans, we
73. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 6 (1976).
74. Id. This litany may sound familiar to modern readers: it echoes several programs
that have been revealed over the past decade. One program was the Bush administration’s
terrorist surveillance program or total information awareness program. See, e.g., Gina M.
Stevens, Cong. Research Serv., RL31730, Privacy: Total Information Awareness Programs
and Related Information Access, Collection, and Protection Laws (2003). The program was
defunded by Congress, but parts of it continued on. Chalmers Johnson, Dismantling the
Empire 105 (2010). The latest revelations about the National Security Agency’s (NSA’s)
current surveillance program were leaked to the Guardian by NSA defector Edward Snowden
and published in June 2013. Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions
of
Verizon
Customers
Daily,
The
Guardian,
Jun.
5,
2013,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order. Then
came further information about a program called PRISM, which collects data from major
Internet providers, including data on Americans; see, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, Here’s Everything
We Know About PRISM to Date, Wash. Post, Jun. 12, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/12/heres-everything-we-knowabout-prism-to-date. On March 24, 2009, the NSA’s inspector general issued a 51-page draft
report on the President’s Surveillance Program, the warrantless authority under which NSA
had collected phone records and email since 2001. This report, classified as top secret, was
also leaked to the Guardian by Snowden. See William Saletan, The Taming of the Spook: A
Secret History of the NSA Surveillance Program Shows It’s Gotten Better, Not Worse , Slate,
Jul. 1, 2013, available at
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/frame_game/2013/07/nsa_history_how_burea
ucrats_leaks_and_courts_tamed_government_surveillance.html.
75. 7 SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, HEARINGS, S. RES. 21, 94th Cong., at 8–10, 62, 66 (1974)
(covering interference in elections in Chile and interference in the elections in post-war Italy).
76. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, ALLEGED
ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. NO. 94465, at 4–5 (1975).
77. RUSSELL A. MILLER, ED., U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE AND
DEMOCRACY: FROM THE CHURCH COMMITTEE TO THE WAR ON TERROR 14 (2008)
(describing the Church Committee reports on CIA intelligence during the Cold War and its
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should never do anything we would be ashamed for the world to know
about.”78 The general consensus was that “[i]f there was one lesson all of
us who served on the Church Committee learned, it was that there are no
secrets, everything comes out, and the promises of improved security
nearly always fail to justify the sacrifice of liberty.”79 In the midst of these
revelations about secrecy and the cover-up of illegal activities, the 1974
amendments to FOIA were being introduced, debated, amended,80 passed,
vetoed, and passed again over the President’s veto. These amendments
clearly shifted the legislative mandate in favor of transparency.
The amendments were squarely directed at problems of
overclassification in the national security and foreign policy context.81
Senator Baker, in describing his tenure on the Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities, recalled viewing “literally hundreds of
Watergate-related documents that had been classified ‘secret’ or ‘top
secret’ . . . 95 percent of [them] should not have been classified in the first
place and that the Nation’s security and foreign policy would not be
damaged in any way by public disclosure of these documents.”82 To the
Attorney General’s concern that the amendments to FOIA “would shift the
burden to the government,” Senator Muskie responded, “[t]he burden is on
the agency to sustain its action.”83 The FOIA imposes the burden because
of “the weight of the Federal bureaucracy, which has made it almost
impossible for us to come to grips with secrecy control and limit the
classification process.”84 The consensus of the conferees was that the
“burden remains on the government under this law.”85 The conferees also
relation to current War on Terror).
78. Id. at 15.
79. Id. at 17. The recommendations of the Church Committee inspired the legislation
that led to the creation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). See DAVID B. COHEN & JOHN W. WELLS, AMERICAN
NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN ERA OF TERRORISM 34 (2004).
80. When the Senate debated the national security exemption to the FOIA, it expressly
removed a requirement that courts sustain the government’s finding that documents were
properly withheld unless the withholding was without a reasonable basis, thereby leaving the
de novo standard undisturbed. S. COMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE & S.
COMM. ON GOV’T INFO. AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, 94TH CONG., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (PUB. L. 93-502) SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
306-28 (J. COMM. PRINT 1975) [hereinafter SOURCE BOOK].
81. It is worth noting that the etymology of bureaucracy is the French word, bureau, a
“desk with drawers for papers”, and the Greek word for “rule”: the tendency to put things
away and shut them up is part of the definition of bureaucracy. See THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 127 (1966).
82. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 807, at 460.
83. Id.
84. 120 CONG. REC. 17,029 (1974) (Statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
85. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 807, at 114.
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discussed, but refused to limit, judicial review of classified material to
“determining if the classification decision had a ‘reasonable basis”86 . . .
and, in fact, felt that the weight given to agency expertise was meant to be
balanced by the weight any other expert could bring to the debate:
Rather, I am saying that I would assume and wish that the judges
give such expert testimony considerable weight. However, in addition,
I would also want the judges to be free to consult such experts in military
affairs . . . or experts on international relations. . .or other experts, and give
their testimony equal weight. 87

The balance the conferees hoped to achieve in the judicial review
process has not been implemented, as very few FOIA requestors have been
able to overcome the judicial reliance on the mention of “substantial
weight” in the legislative history, notwithstanding the existence of other
balancing language.88 Indeed, the general rule in FOIA cases since 1974
has been that the courts, “lacking expertise in the substantive matters at
hand, must give substantial weight to agency statements, so long as they
are plausible and not called into question by contrary evidence or evidence
of agency bad faith.”89 No court seems to have taken up the congressional
call for the use of “other experts,” and have simply stated that they lack
expertise.90 Instead, courts have routinely refused to hear the testimony of
other experts. Some examples of experts whose views have been rejected
include a United States Senator who had read the requested document in
his official capacity as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations,91
86. S. 2534, 93d Cong. (1974) included the limiting language, but the proposed
language was stricken from the bill by a Senate motion carried by a 56-29 vote. 120 CONG.
REC. 17,022-32 (1974).
87. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 807, at 308.
88. Id.; S. REP. NO. 93-1200, at 12 (1974) (Conf. Rep.). The text of the statute reads:
On complaint, the district court . . . has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding
agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from
the complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo, and may
examine the contents of such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or
any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of
this section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
89. Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1980). For a more recent case, see
Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing
Halperin, and finding that “the government’s assessment is plausible, and as there is no
contrary evidence or evidence of bad faith, we accept its representations . . . .”).
90. See e.g., Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 837 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (holding that because courts lack expertise in national security matters they must give
“substantial weight to agency statements”).
91. Washington Post v. DOD, No. 84-2949, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16108 (D.D.C.
Feb. 25, 1987) (a staff writer sought to compel the DOD to disclose a report prepared in
order to help the Salvadorean government develop a military strategy), cited in U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE. OFFICE OF INFORMATION POLICY. GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT,
2009 Ed. 150, at fn. 40 Washington, DC: U.S. GOV’T PRINT. OFFICE (2009) (hereinafter
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an admiral,92 a former CIA agent,93 and a former ambassador who had
personally prepared some of the records at issue,94 among others.95 Courts
have “demonstrated deference to agency expertise by according little or no
weight to opinions of persons other than the agency classification
authority.”96 Only once has a court actually appointed a special master to
review and categorize classified documents.97
Nor did passing the 1974 amendments end the political battle. President
Ford vetoed the amendments to FOIA, on the advice of Chief of Staff
Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Chief of Staff Richard Cheney, who warned
that, among other concerns, the amendments would go too far in allowing
judicial review of classified documents.98 Antonin Scalia weighed in with
arguments that the amendments were unconstitutional.99
Congress
FOIA GUIDE 2009).
92. See Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep’t of Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 421–22
(2d Cir. 1989) (ruling in favor of Navy’s claim of exemption regarding alleged environmental
law violations since the judicial branch cannot analyze alleged violations, but noting that Navy
is subject to Congressional environmental laws), cited in FOIA GUIDE 2009, supra note 88, at
150 n. 41.
93. Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1102–03 n5 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (describing that
student sought disclosure of information of CIA contacts with a university after CIA provided
affidavits to establish exemption), as cited in FOIA GUIDE 2009,, supra note 88, at 150 n. 41.
94. See Rush v. Dep’t of State, 748 F. Supp. 1548, 1554 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding a
former ambassador working on requested documents could be denied information if it was
properly classified), cited in FOIA GUIDE 2009,, supra note 88, at 150 n. 41.
95. See Pfeiffer v. CIA, 721 F. Supp. 337, 340–341 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding a former
CIA employee can similarly be denied information if it was properly classified), cited in FOIA
GUIDE 2009, supra note 88, at 150 n. 41.
96. CORNISH F. HITCHCOCK, GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND
PRIVACY ACTS , VOLUME 1, at 158–159 (2014) (analyzing both the Freedom of Information
and Privacy Acts).
97. In re United States Dep’t of Def., 848 F.2d 232, 235 (D.C. Circ. 1988) (upholding
the District Court’s appointment of a special master (a security-cleared intelligence expert) to
create a representative sample of the withheld documents and to summarize for the court the
arguments each side made or could have made, regarding the exemptions). The District
Court judge was dissatisfied with alternative means of document review, including giving the
judge’s clerks security clearances so they could review the documents, allowing the
government to prepare a sample index, citing case authority that questioned the impartiality of
government-run sampling, or a purely random sample. Id. at 234. See also Patricia M. Wald,

“Some Exceptional Condition”- The Anatomy of a Decision Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 53(b), 62 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 405, 407–408 (1988) (discussing the judge’s
dissatisfaction with the alternative means of document review). The special master was
ordered to proceed in Washington Post v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Civ.A. 84-3400-LFO, 1988
WL 73852, at *1 (D.D.C. Jun. 6, 1988).
98. See Veto Battle 30 Years Ago Set Freedom of Information Norms (Dan Lopez et al.
eds, NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK NO. 142, Nov. 23, 2004)
(History of FOIA goals and norms), http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB142.
99. See id. For more detail on the basis of Antonin Scalia’s opposition, see Antonin
Scalia, The Freedom of Infomration Act Has No Clothes, Regulation, Mar./Apr. 1982, at 14.
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overrode the veto. In the debates regarding the veto, Senator Baker
weighed in on the side of disclosure, stating that the risk that a judge might
“disclose legitimate national security information” was worth bearing as
transparency would help stop “the potential for mischief and criminal
activity.” 100 The 1974 FOIA national security amendment was intended to
further access to overclassified documents.101 The hearings and testimony
on the amendment refer to the need to “ensure an informed citizenry, vital
to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against
corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.”102 The
debate and the amendment were made in a time, much like our own, when
revelations about the secret machinations of government made daily
headlines, and there was open discussion about the problem of too much
secrecy. But the trend towards secrecy has not abated since 9/11.
As has often been noted, we now live in a state of permanent
emergency.103 Presidential authority has expanded dramatically in the
national security sphere, and the traditional checks are widely viewed as
ineffective or inappropriate.104 While there has been some movement
under the Obama administration towards proactive release of
information,105 which makes FOIA requests redundant, this has not
occurred in the national security context. The next section discusses some
possible reasons for the courts’ unwillingness to participate in enhancing
transparency.
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING UNDER CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY
Cognitive psychology has identified several ways in which actual
decisionmaking runs counter to the model of the rational, self-interested
100. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 78, at 461.
101. 120 CONG. REC. 17,029 (1974).
102. N.L.R.B. v Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1977).
103. See GEORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 2—6 (Kevin Attell trans., University
of Chicago Press 2005) (arguing that uses of “states of exception” to justify abuses of power are
normal government models); Laura Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1573, 1723 et seq. (2011) (discussing the expansion of national security—and
militarism— into realms previously unassociated with national security, including the
environment, health, drugs and crime).
104. See JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012) (discussing increase of presidential power post-9/11 and its
relation with legal/political constraints); see also ERIC. A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE,
TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 20 (2007) (denying that
courts or judges, as an institutional matter, can improve on executive decision making during
emergencies).
105. See Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685,
Jan. 21, 2009; Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Open
Government Directive, Dec. 8, 2009.
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person, which forms the basis of so many discussions about legal problemsolving. When making decisions, it turns out, there are a number of
distinct biases that individuals bring to the decisionmaking process; the
relevant one here concerns “availability”, the overweighting of information
at hand.106 This is a variation of the concept of salience in decisionmaking,
which was popularized by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman.107 The
availability heuristic tilts decisionmaking towards “prominent”
information, so that people “rely too heavily on information that is readily
available or prominent, ignoring information that they do not see as often
or as readily or that is in the background.”108 This bias trumps more
thoughtful determinations of frequency and probability.109 Of particular
relevance for present purposes, it distorts the ability to assess lowprobability events that might have large consequences.110
As Stephen Schulhofer has pointed out, the “reasons for judicial
resistance to [de novo] review, despite the statutory mandate for it, are not
mysteries: Judges feel they lack competence and the stakes are too high.”111
In the realm of decisionmaking about national security, the stakes of the
worst-case scenario—that terrorists will, for example, get sufficient
information from the release of any given document to harm national
security—trumps the probability or likelihood of that actually happening,
given the vast number of over-classified documents.112
See Bless Schwarz, et al., Ease of Retrieval as Information: Another Look at the Availability
Heuristic. 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 19 (1991).
107. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahnemann, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982); Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in
Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 264—266 (2011) (explaining salience bias against
106

transparency and complexity biases and discusses in relation to federal income taxes and
discrete provisions).
108. Schenk, supra note 104. Economists’ studies have shown that when something is
salient, it had a more pronounced effect on behavior and responses. Id. at 265.
109. See Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES at 192 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds., 1981) (“Salience biases refer to the fact that colorful,
dynamic, or other distinctive stimuli disproportionately engage attention and accordingly
disproportionately affect judgments.”). An example of the salience bias in action is illustrated
by CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178—179 (1985) (allowing the CIA to withhold superficially
innocuous information on ground that it might enable observer to discover identity of
intelligence source).
110. See Colin Cammerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low
Probability Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. POL’Y ANAL. & MGM’T 565 (1989) (showing how
people misjudge low probability events).
111. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Secrecy and Democracy: Who Controls Information in the
National Security State, NYU SCHOOL OF LAW WORKING PAPER NO. 10-53, at 48, Public
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, (2010).
112. See Craig E. Jones, The Troubling New Science of Legal Persuasion: Heuristics
and Biases in Judicial Decision-Making,” 41 THE ADVOCS’ Q. 49, 75 (2013).
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This is not to maintain that mere probability should be the deciding
factor in an FOIA case, but it should be an element in an analysis by a court
of whether to seriously review a government claim that a document is
properly classified or to undertake an in camera review in order to make
the determination. But the availability heuristic may help explain the
relatively low incidence of disclosure orders or true de novo review,113 and
judicial experience or training does not exempt judges from the effects of
this
bias.114
Regarding the legislative requirement for judicial review of agency
determinations regarding national security, courts have long refused to
entertain requests for de novo review in FOIA cases except in the most
exceptional circumstances, and have generally refused to hear evidence
from outside experts proffered by plaintiffs, even when those experts have
the highest qualifications.115 Despite clear directives from Congress,
including a direct Congressional override of the early judicial adoption of
deference in FOIA Exemption 1 cases, trial courts have in fact exhibited
extreme reluctance to actually make any determinations in these cases that
are contrary to government assertions of national security.116 This seems to
be a classic case of uncertainty in decisionmaking leading to refusal to
make decisions. As Adrian Vermeule notes, in decision theory, “[t]he term
uncertainty is reserved for the class of situations in which the decision
maker knows the payoffs associated with various outcomes but not the
probability that the possible outcomes will come to pass.”117
This perfectly describes the dilemma faced by FOIA courts: the judge
knows that if the information is suppressed, the public will not have access
to information it is legitimately entitled to know. On the other hand, if the
information is truly properly classified and its release will cause damage to
the security of the United States, then the goal of protecting the security of
113. Id. at 51. (explaining that in cognitive psychology, heuristics are “cognitive shortcuts
that we use as something like defaults in the decisionmaking process. These heuristics operate
mostly at a subconscious level.”).
114. Id. at 65. Attorneys and judges can be more resistant than the general populace to a
few biases (framing effects and the representative heuristic), but not the ones discussed here.
Id. at 73. Mortality reminders, like those connected with scenarios of terrorism, have been
shown to make judges more “defensive and in-group oriented, and thus more harshly
judgmental of unconventional moral norms.” Id. at 63. The in-group (or group to which the
subject belongs id.) in a FOIA case where the national security exemption is being claimed
would be the government, and the actual classifiers would be a sub-set of the government, just
as judges are subsets of the government. FOIA requesters, on the other hand, are the outgroup.
See page 20, supra, and associated footnotes.
See Part IV, infra at XXX>
117. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 114 (2000) (examining
problems with judicial statutory interpretation).
115
116
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the United States will not be met. Apparently feeling unable to assess the
probability that the release of the information will damage the security of
the United States, the courts have routinely deferred to the government in
situations where hindsight has shown it was foolish to do so.118 Routine
deference immunizes the courts from criticism if the low probability large
harm occurs. But that still leaves courts relying on the supposed expertise
of government bureaucrats. Relying on supposed experts can have
negative consequences where “the group is influenced by some selection
bias, professional norm, or opinion cascade that herds the whole group
towards one policy option without independent consideration by (most of)
the group’s members . . . .”119
There are, of course, many situations where judges make difficult
decisions and are not seemingly paralyzed by fear of consequences, even in
the national security context.120 The Pentagon Papers case is a prime
example. Relying on both the First and the Fourth Amendments, the court
in New York Times v. United States refused to restrain the publication of
the Pentagon Papers.121 It may have mattered that the Pentagon Papers
were already published, and the sky had not fallen, but the court had no
trouble balancing national security and civil liberties in that case. Meredith
Fuchs has suggested that the need to confront the First Amendment directly
made the difference in that case.122 But a First Amendment analysis is
notably missing from most cases concerning the right to information. The
debate about access to government information and the passage of the
FOIA were taking place at the same time that the Supreme Court was
expanding its First Amendment jurisprudence.
If the FOIA had not been enacted when it was, there might be a more

118. See e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), where the government
claimed it would have to reveal state secrets about a plane’s spy mechanism for the case to go
forward, but when the report was declassified 50 years later, no national security secrets were
involved, just evidence that the plane malfunctioned. See discussion infra, at page 35.
119. Id. at 119.
120. In contexts other than the FOIA, it has been noted that, in the tradeoff between
security and liberty, even if courts feel a lack of expertise in national security, they are experts
in liberty, and so must exercise that expertise in the weighing of the risks and benefits. See
Thomas P. Crocker, Who Decides on Liberty?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1151 (2012).
121. 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
122. As Meredith Fuchs has stated: “No clear reason explains why the Court would judge
itself more competent to assess the need to keep information secret simply because the
information had already been leaked to the press. When faced with the government’s request
to enjoin publication, however, the Court had to directly confront the First Amendment. Had
the Pentagon Papers not been leaked, there would have been no First Amendment clash to
resolve—secrecy for the purpose of covering up government misrepresentations would have
triumphed.” Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing
Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 170. (2006).
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explicit First Amendment protection of access to government information
as a subset of the constitutionally protected right to receive information.123
Before the FOIA was passed, scholars looked to the First Amendment to
create a broader right to know about the workings of the government.124
Despite the Supreme Court’s continued affirmation of a constitutionally
protected right to receive information,125 the Court has relied on the FOIA,
not the Constitution, to protect access to most government information.126
Although the right to know about all of the workings of the government
may be implied in the right to petition the government, the Supreme Court
has limited access to government information in the context of considering
the press’ constitutional right to information about certain trial
proceedings.127
Congress did in fact give the courts a potentially powerful tool to use to
analyze matters of national security: experts.128 While individual judges
may not have expertise in matters of national security, even without the
Congressional mandate in FOIA’s legislative history, courts have “solid
institutional capacities to elicit expertise.”129 As Stephen Schulhofer points
out, national security expertise requires balancing two types of institutional
values, secrecy and transparency; and while national security officials
123. FOERSTEL, supra note 32, at 66–67; FOIA and the First Amendment:
Representative Democracy and the People’s Elusive “Right to Know,” supra note 57, at 17–
18.
124.

See, e.g., Wallace Parks, The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to
Know Under the Constitution, 26 GEO. WASHINGTON L. REV. 1, 3 (1957) (discussing
constitutional issues relevant to statutory and presidential action required to create an openly
informative government).
125. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147(1943) (deciding that local law prohibiting
door-to-door distribution considered a violation of constitutional freedoms of speech and
press), to U.S. v. American Library Ass’n. Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (finding that Congress
was permitted to pass internet act requiring public libraries to have internet filters in order to
receive federal subsidies as being designed to meet educational and informational purposes),
the Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to receive information.
126. One early commenter on the 1974 revisions to the FOIA hoped that the FOIA
would provide a procedural framework to adjudicate the right to know; that has not
happened. See David Mitchell Ivester, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS CON.
L. Q. 109, 161–62 (1977) (advocating for injecting a constitutional right to know into the
discussion where national defense and foreign policy claims for withholding information are
made).
127. See generally Barry P. MacDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of
Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65
OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 257–302 (2004) (arguing that jurisprudence disfavors flow of information
in the interest of protecting the government, academia, or private organizations).
128. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 80, at 308.
129. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Oversight of National Security Secrecy in the United States,
New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers. Paper 396.
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/396, Forthcoming in SECRECY, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE
VINDICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, DAVID COLE ET AL., eds., at 2 (2013).
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abhor transparency, judges thoroughly understand the values of
transparency.130
Although judges may express a lack of expertise, deciding issues of
national security arises in many contexts. Judges have automatic access to
classified information as an aspect of their status,131 and review national
security issues under many laws, including the Classified Information
Procedures Act, the Fourth Amendment, and the Foreign Intelligence
132
Surveillance
Act,
in
addition
to
the
FOIA.
The result of the courts’ failure to follow the balancing procedures set
out in the FOIA is that the balance has tilted towards excessive secrecy,
with all its attendant ills. The 1974 FOIA amendments made it clear that
the courts were directed to perform substantive reviews of agency claims
that information was properly classified, and that Mink’s rubber stamp
approval of agency determinations was not consistent with the purpose of
the FOIA. As David Pozen points out, “[a]bdication, again, exacerbates
delegation’s disadvantages as well as its advantages. Legally, delegation
threatens FOIA’s principles of segregation and individualized document
review; it undermines the Act’s allocations of burdens, if not de novo
review itself; and it violates legislative intent.”133 The incentive provided
by the possibility of rigorous oversight at least some of the time has
recently been called the “observer effect.”134 Failure to perform a rigorous
oversight function often enough to make unfavorable court review a factor
in agency determinations disincentivizes agencies from thinking more
deeply about whether or not a document needs to be classified or could be
provided despite classification.135
130.
131.

Id.
See, e.g., Fred F. Manget, Intelligence and the Rise of Judicial Intervention,

NATIONALSECURITYAW.org,

at
1
(2006),
http://www.nationalsecuritylaw.org/files/pubs/Manget.pdf; 32 C.F.R. 154.16(d)(5).
132. Id. at 4–8.
133. The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115
YALE L. J. 628, 668 (2005).
134. Ashley Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy
Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 834–838 (2013) (defining the
effects of being observed by courts on executive policy). The observer effect is in play outside
the executive policy arena. Id. at 834, fn. 19. An example of the observer effect on agencies
would be “hard look” judicial review deterring agencies from “implementing policies rashly or
without factual basis.” Id. at 853, fn. 127.
135. Agencies do not have to claim an exemption where no harm would result from the
disclosure. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, supra note 53 at 293, discussing agency discretion to
claim exemption or provide documents. See also CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d
1132, 1333–34 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (explaining that an agency’s FOIA disclosure decision can
“be grounded either in its view that none of the FOIA exemptions applies, and thus that
disclosure is mandatory, or in its belief that release is justified in the exercise of its discretion,
even though the data fall within one or more of the statutory exemptions.”).
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The actual impact of court review on agency action might be variable,
depending on the agency involved and the frequency of invocation of the
Exemption. Some agencies rarely invoke the Exemption, but others do so
routinely. For example, the Department of Justice, one of the agencies that
make Exemption One claims, received 69,456 FOIA requests in 2012, and
only 408 of those implicated Exemption One (0.01%).136 Within the
Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation received 12,783
of those FOIA requests, and 333 involved a claim that Exemption One
applied (0.03%).137 But where the primary focus of an agency implicates
national security, as one might expect, the percentage of times an agency
invokes Exemption One goes up. The Central Intelligence Agency
received 3745 FOIA requests, and claimed Exemption One applied to 2112
of them (56%).138 The National Security Agency received 1809 FOIA
requests, and claimed Exemption One in 1104 cases (61%).139 The Defense
Intelligence Agency received 1144 requests, and claimed Exemption One
applied in 344 of them (30%).140 The Office of the Director of National
Intelligence received 343 FOIA requests, and claimed that Exemption One
applied in 51 of them (15%).141 These agencies are necessarily involved in
national security classification and might be more likely to pay attention to
being observed by the courts.
Just because a decision is difficult does not mean that reasoned decisions
can be avoided. Judges make difficult decisions in a variety of contexts,
including those that involve the First Amendment; in these cases “judges
are well-suited to recognize interference with the flow of information about
government affairs.”142 There is no reason why judges cannot set up
procedures that will allow them to evaluate the risks associated with
disclosure.143 Appointing referees, allowing experts to testify on behalf of
disclosure, and creating specialized courts have all been suggested as
possibilities to add some balance to a system that does not recognize the
overwhelming evidence of overclassification or balance the harmful effects
of secrecy against the harmful effects of disclosure.144

136. These percentages were created using FOIA.gov’s
http:www.foia.gov.data.html. The data is on file with the author.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Judging Secrets, supra note 118, at 170.
143. Id. at 170–71.
144. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 80, at 175, 308.

data

generator,

at
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III. OVERCLASSIFICATION AND THE ILLUSION OF AGENCY EXPERTISE
We have seen that courts defer to agency expertise in national security
matters; indeed the legislative history of the 1974 amendments to FOIA
made many references to “substantial deference” to agency expertise in
national security matters.145 So if in fact there is systemic
overclassification, then deference as a matter of course is troubling:
information is not being released that should be. We suggest that there is
overwhelming evidence that agencies in fact routinely overclassify
documents, and that the motivation for classification arises from an agency
culture of secrecy. Agents sometimes seek to legitimize the superior value
of expert information by designating it as “secret.” They also use
classification to prevent the exposure of embarrassing and politically
volatile information that has no national security value.146 This section
examines the reasons for overclassification and the “classification state.”
During the 1973 hearings on Executive Privilege, Secrecy in
Government and Freedom of Information, one of the witnesses was
William G. Florence, a retired Air Force Security Analyst with decades of
experience in reviewing and classifying documents.147 He stated that
“[t]here is abundant proof that the false philosophy of classifying
information in the name of national security is the source of most of the
secrecy
evils
in
the
executive
branch.”148
Mr. Florence listed the most common reasons information is classified,
and none of his eight reasons are related to any actual harm to the security
interests of the United States. The reasons given by Mr. Florence were:
145. See SOURCE BOOK, supra note 80, at 308. See, e.g., Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear
Arms Control-Philadelphia Chapter v. Dep’t of Energy, 766 F. Supp. 318, 322 (E.D. Pa.
1991), where the court, referring to the legislative history of the FOIA amendments, stated
that “[b]ecause executive departments handling defense and foreign policy matters have
‘unique insights’ into the dangers of public exposure, courts are to ‘accord substantial weight
to an agency’s affidavits concerning the details of the classified status of a disputed record.’
Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 970 (D.C.Cir.1982) (quoting S.R. 1200, 93rd Cong.,
2d Sess. 12 (1974) (conference report) reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
6267, 6290).” The court cited American Friends Service Committee, 831 F.2d at 444
(adopting standard of D.C. Circuit as stated in Abbotts v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
766 F.2d 604, 606 (D.C.Cir.1985)).
146. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 80, at 460–61.
147. Mr. Florence served 22 years in the Army and the Air Force, and served 21 more
years with the Department of Defense in civilian status. For 26 years, his duties included the
development and application of policy for classifying and declassifying official information.
From 1971 to 1973, he served as a security consultant to Government contractors in matters
involving national defense considerations, and was associated with the defense in the EllsbergRusso Pentagon papers case. Executive Privilege Secrecy in Government Freedom of
Information: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations, 93D CONG. 285
(1973) (statement of William G. Florence, Air Force security analyst).
148. Id.
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1. newness of the information;
2. keep it out of newspapers;
3. foreigners might be interested;
4. don’t give it away – and you hear the old cliché, don’t give it to them
on a silver platter;
5. association of separate nonclassified items;
6. reuse of old information without declassification;
7. personal prestige; and
8. habitual practice, including clerical routine.149
Mr. Florence is among those experts who have quantified the amount of
properly classified information, and in his opinion, somewhere between
one-half of one percent and five percent of all classified information is in
fact properly classified.150 Once documents are classified, it can be
extremely difficult to convince an agency to change that classification,
even when the documents have been made public. Mr. Florence gave an
example from the Daniel Ellsberg trial in 1969, regarding twenty
documents that were made a part of the public record during the trial and
where “[t]he judge specifically ruled that all material introduced as
evidence is public, and that the still-classified documents are available to
anyone. Both departments [Defense and State] have repeatedly refused to
cancel the classification markings assigned to their respective documents to
this day.”151
A more current example dates from the George W. Bush Administration,
when the Justice Department requested that the Judiciary Committee
remove several letters regarding a government investigation into claims
that important translations were not being done properly prior to the Sept.
11 terrorist attacks.152 The Judiciary Committee removed two of the letters
Id. at 287.
U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices—Security Classification
Problems Involving Subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information of Act (Part 7): Before
the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 92D CONG. 2296 (1972) (statement of
149.
150.

William G. Florence).
151. Cong. Rec. S., August 1, 1975, page 26895. 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
152. Classified Letters Regarding FBI Whistleblower Sibel Edmonds, THE MEMORY
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from its Web site.153 It took a lawsuit to get the Justice Department to
admit that retroactive classification was impossible, since the letters had
been already published on the Internet.154
William J. Leonard, retired head of the Information Security Oversight
Office, has noted that, although no document may be classified to: “conceal
violations of law, prevent embarrassment to a person or agency, restrain
competition, or delay the release of declassifiable information,”155 no one
has ever been disciplined for violating these provisions. Leonard’s agency
had responsibility for enforcing classification policy throughout the
government and under the National Industrial Security Program).156
There is evidence that, despite the clear directives in executive orders on
classification, agencies routinely use classification for every one of the
prohibited reasons.
The Church Report was not the last major
Congressional report on excessive secrecy and improper classification.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the chairman of the 1997 Commission on
Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, stated that using the
“sources and methods”157 method of classifying information has meant that
how the information is obtained, not the content of the information, is a
major determinant of classification; almost everything that an intelligence
agency collects, including information from open sources, is automatically
classified:158 this meant that “in 1995 there were 21,871 ‘original’ Top
Secret designations and 374,244 ‘derivative’ designations.’”159 Mr.
HOLE,
https://web.archive.org/web/20090317040641/http://www.thememoryhole.org/spy/edmonds_l
etters.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2013); Chris Strohm, Lawsuits Challenge Justice Department
Efforts to Classify Previously Public Information, Daily Briefing (Jun. 28, 2004),
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0604/062804c1.htm.
153. Id.
154. Stipulation of Dismissal, Project on Gov’t Oversight v. Ashcroft, Civ. No.1:04cv1032
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 9, 2004) (on file with author); see also Letter of Vesper Mei, U.S. Dept. of
Justice, to Michael T. Kirkpatrick, Public Citizen Litigation Group (Feb. 18, 2005), available
at http://pogo.org/m/gp/gp-02182005-JusticeDeptLetter.pdf (acknowledging that the letters are
“releasable in full, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act”) (last accessed Jan. 22, 2014).
155. Classified National Security Information, Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg.
707, 710 (Jan. 5, 2010).
156. Bill Weaver, State Secrets and the Temptations for Misuse, NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISORS:
A
NATIONAL
SECURITY
LAW
BLOG,
(May
22,
2007),
http://www.natseclaw.com/natseclaw/2007/05/paving_the_road.html. Bill Weaver asked
William Leonard, then the head of the Information Security Oversight Office, the office
responsible to the President for policy and oversight of the Government-wide security
classification system and the National Industrial Security Program, whether anyone had ever
been disciplined for violating the Executive Order. No one could remember one single
instance of discipline, despite the fact that there “are three million derivative classifiers.” Id.
157. National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C.A. § 401 (1947).
158. S. REP. NO. 105-2, at XXVII (1997) [hereinafter the Moynihan Report].
159. Id. at XXXIX (“Many of these ‘derivative’ designations involve ‘sources and
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Moynihan asks: “can there really have been some 400,000 secrets created
in 1995, the disclosure of any one of which would cause ‘exceptionally
grave damage to the national security’?” 160
To bring these numbers more up to date, in 2011 there were 127,072
original classifications,161 and over 50 million derivative classifications
made in 2010, the last year for which there are figures.162 To update Daniel
Moynihan’s question, can there really have been over 50 million secrets
created in 2010, the disclosure of any one of which would have caused
exceptionally grave damage to the national security?
In 1993, then-Senator John F. Kerry of Massachusetts made a comment
regarding classified documents reviewed by the Select Committee on
POW/MIA Affairs. He stated: “I do not think more than a hundred, or a
couple of hundred, pages of the thousands of documents we looked at had
any current classification importance, and more often than not they were
documents that remained classified or were classified to hide negative
political information, not secrets.”163
Daniel Moynihan relied on Max Weber’s theories about bureaucracy
when he framed secrecy as a pernicious form of regulation: “Max Weber,
who first set forth, over eight decades ago, that secrecy was a normal mode
by which bureaucracies conduct their business. . . . Rulemaking was the
distinctive mode of bureaucracy. We came to call it regulation. If the
present report is to serve any large purpose, it is to introduce the public to
the thought that secrecy is a mode of regulation.”164 The default mode of
security bureaucracies is secrecy; when a decision needs to be made about
whether or not to classify something as secret, there are implicit rules and
norms in place that favor overclassification. Institutionalized rules and
norms can be followed unthinkingly, until some feedback from above lets
people know the rules and norms are not working properly, and for
agencies, judicial constraints on decision making are a way to signal that
specific types of decisions will not pass statutory muster.165 There are
methods,’ one of the subjects concerning intelligence mentioned in the National Security Act
of 1947. A report about troop movements might reveal that we have satellite photography in
the region; such like matters.”).
160. Id.
161. Openthegovernment.org,
Secrecy
Report
2012,
at
20,
http://www.openthegovernment.org/sites/default/files/Secrecy2012_web.pdf. The government
did not release the number of derivatively classified documents in 2011. Id. at 21.
162. Openthegovernment.org,
Secrecy
Report
2011,
at
23,
http://www.openthegovernment.org/sites/default/files/SRC_2011.pdf,
163. Moynihan Report, supra note 1583, at XXXI-XXXII.
164. Id. at XXXVI.
165. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 493–494 (2001-2002). The other
methods include a crisis calling the rule into question, a new leadership with new ways, or
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sound reasons for curtailing excessive overclassification.
There are many dangers from excessive secrecy. Regarding the dangers
of hiding things from the public, Moynihan notes that in the 60s and 70s,
scientists were clear that overclassification of scientific evidence was
actually a danger to America’s national security, as it “deprive[s] the
country of the lead time that results from the free exchange of ideas and
information” and that the amount of technical information that was
overclassified or improperly classified was as much as 90 per cent.166
The range of estimates for the amount of overclassification varies, but
the fact of massive overclassification does not. Many of the estimates of
overclassification have been made by people with years of experience in
the government. The fact that there is a consensus that a large percentage
of what is classified need not be classified should change the risk analysis
for judicial review. When determining the likelihood of an event
happening, courts should not be insensitive to the prior probability of the
outcome. If there is a likelihood that, to be conservative, 50% of
documents are not properly classified, that probability needs to be taken
into account when determining the likelihood that a claim of exemption
should be reviewed by the court or should be treated with skepticism, or
that releasing a particular document will cause a major national security
harm. Failure to do so causes judges to over-estimate the probability that
the document is properly classified—and those properly classified
documents are the only documents the first exemption to the FOIA protects
from disclosure.167 The Moynihan Report points out the resulting harm of
this practice: “One legacy of a century of real and imagined conspiracy,
most of it cloaked in secrecy, is that the American public has acquired a
distrust of government almost in proportion to the effort of government to
attempt to be worthy of trust.”168
Of course, not everyone associated with the government is dissatisfied
with the way in which the federal courts have interpreted the Congressional
mandate for muscular review of claims that national security exempts
documents in FOIA disclosure; there are those who believe that the
executive’s mandate to control national security should not be interfered
Congressional or Presidentially imposed constraints. Id. Some combination of these
methods have all been relied upon to intervene in the bureaucracy of secrecy, to little
apparent effect to date.
166. Moynihan Report, supra note 153, at Appendix A-61.
167. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974) (looks at failure of decisionmaking because of heuristics and
biases).
168. Moynihan Report, supra note 1583, at Appendix A-75. The recent Snowden
disclosures have raised a storm of distrust, even though the government has claimed legal
legitimacy for some of its actions; the secrecy itself is part of the problem. See infra, note 206..
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with by the judiciary.169 The argument that documents can’t be released
because of national security concerns is not, of course, limited to the FOIA.
Many fascinating examples of claims of national security that have turned
out to be false come from cases outside FOIA, such as the state secret claim
in Edmonds v. Department of Justice,170 where the government
retroactively classified documents that had been available on the United
States Senate website.171
An earlier example of a claim that turned out to be valid was at issue in
the case of New York Times v. United States,172 in which then-Solicitor
General Erwin N. Griswold argued that disclosure would pose the threat of
serious injury to the national security.173 Mr. Griswold later recanted:
I have never seen any trace of a threat to the national security from the
publication. Indeed, I have never seen it even suggested that there was such
an actual threat. Sen. Gravel’s edition is now almost completely forgotten,
and I doubt if there is more than a handful of persons who have ever
undertaken to examine the Pentagon Papers in any detail—either with
respect to national security or with respect to the policies of the country
relating to Vietnam.

It quickly becomes apparent to any person who has considerable
experience with classified material that there is massive overclassification
and that the principal concern of the classifiers is not with national security,
but rather with governmental embarrassment of one sort or another. There
may be some basis for short-term classification while plans are being made,
or negotiations are going on, but apart from details of weapons systems,
there is very rarely any real risk to current national security from the
publication of facts relating to transactions in the past, even the fairly
recent past. This is the lesson of the Pentagon Papers experience, and it
169. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 907–
908 (2006); Laura A. White, The Need for Governmental Secrecy: Why the U.S.
Government Must Be Able to Withhold Information in the Interest of National Security, 43
VA. J. INT’L L. 1071 (2003).
170. Edmonds v. Dep’t. of Justice, 161 Fed. Appx. 6 (D.C. Cir., 2005), cert. denied, 546
U.S. 1031 (2005). Sibel Edmonds was a CIA translator, who claimed she was fired for
whistleblowing; her case was dismissed, despite evidence that her allegations were true and
that she had been fired for whistleblowing. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector
General, Office of Oversight and Review, A Review of the FBI’s Actions in Connection with
Allegations Raised by Contract Linguist Sibel Edmonds: Unclassified Summary, Jan. 2005,
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0501/final.pdf.
171. Anne E. Kornblut, Translator in Eye of Storm on Retroactive Classification
BOSTON.COM,
Jul.
5,
2004,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004/07/05/translator_in_eye_of_storm_on_retr
oactive_classification/?page=full.
172. Discussed supra note 45.
173. Brief for the United States at 18, N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971) (No. 1873), 1971 WL 167581.
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may be relevant now.174
The government can use national security as a trump card in litigation,
and has been doing so for quite some time. Bill Weaver worked for the
NSA for nine years, and reviewed and created classified information as a
daily part of his job.175 Speaking in the context of the state secrets
privilege, he called for oversight, as he has “no doubt [the privilege] is
often abused.”176 He “observed and personally engaged in abuse of
overclassification and saw unclassified items classified in order to prevent
their disclosure. These problems are rampant and seemingly incurable.”177
There are no apparent penalties for classifying things for the improper
reasons set out in Executive Orders.
According to Weaver, the
“classification of unclassified material and overclassification are actions
that are viewed favorably by managers. If one does or claims otherwise
one will not have a job very long.”178 In the face of his personal knowledge
of improper and overclassification, Weaver states that “there is no reason
that judges should treat claims of classification and dangers that will occur
from disclosure as sober judgments made in the best interests of the
country[.]” 179 Too often, Weaver notes, it is politics, personal concerns,
and fear of embarrassment that lead to classification decisions.180 Retired
Admiral Gene LaRocque testified in 1972 hearings before the Foreign
Operations and Government Information Subcommittee about the reasons
that the military overclassified information:

174. Erwin N. Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping; The Courts and Classified
Information, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25.
175. National Security Advisors: a National Security Law Blog, State Secrets and the
Temptations
for
Misuse,
(May
22,
2007),
http://www.natseclaw.com/natseclaw/2007/05/paving_the_road.html.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. Id.
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Other reasons for classifying material are: to keep it from other military
services, from civilians in the Defense Department, from the State
Department, and of course, from Congress. Sometimes, information is
classified
to
withhold
it
for
later release to maximize the effect on the public or on the Congress.
Frequently, information is classified so that only portions of it can be
released selectively to the press to influence the public or the Congress.181

Just recently, the nominee for Director of National Intelligence, Admiral
Dennis C. Blair, admitted “There is a great deal of overclassification, . . . .
Some of it, I think, is done for the wrong reasons, to try and hide things
from the light of day. Some of it is because in our system, there is no
incentive not to do that, and there are penalties for the reverse, in case you
get something wrong and don’t classify it.”182 As Steven Aftergood, who
directs the Federation of American Scientists Project on Government
Secrecy, has noted, it isn’t that government officials can’t follow the
procedural rules for classifying information; it is that their “subjective
‘determination’ that classification is necessary” is an “error in
judgment.”183
This culture of excessive secrecy is the reason that Congress asked the
judiciary to balance claims of secrecy with common sense, expert
testimony, and careful review. The courts have not complied. One small
part of the problem is that judges do not understand what agencies do when
they classify information, according to Alex Rossmiller.184 The Author
worked at the Defense Intelligence Agency and knows that documents’

181. Hearings, U.S. House of Representatives, the Foreign Operations and Government
Information Subcommittee, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Government

Information Policies and Practices - Security Classification Problems Involving Subsection
(b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act, Part 7, 93rd Cong. 2909–2910 (1972).
182. Secrecy News, Blair: Intel Classification Policy Needs “Fundamental Work,” Jan.
26, 2009, http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/. During questioning, Blair pledged to use
classification policy “only to protect national security and not to manipulate public opinion or
frame or mis-frame political debates.” Id.
183. Steven Aftergood, Secrecy News: FAS Project on Government Secrecy, Volume
2013, Issue No. 62 July 8, 2013, http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/. “Thus, for example, when an
agency’s classification judgment is overruled by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals
Panel— which happens with some frequency—it is not because of an error in procedure but
because of an error in judgment.” Id. The vagaries of judgment are illustrated by one
author’s experience with the FOIA: “In many of the documents I obtained through the
Freedom of Information Act, the redactions by government censors made little sense. Exactly
the same information would be supplied in one document, yet blacked out in another.” ERIC
SCHLOSSER, COMMAND AND CONTROL: NUCLEAR WEAPONS THE DAMASCUS INCIDENT,
AND THE ILLUSION OF SAFETY, 466 (2013) [hereinafter COMMAND AND CONTROL].
184. Alex Rossmiller, Adjudicating Classified Information, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1275
(2011).
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classification is often done so that others will take the information more
seriously.185 For judges reviewing documents that the government claims
are properly classified, it is important to understand the conditional
language of classification. This refers to the use of
“phrases such as we judge, we assess, and we estimate—and probabilistic
terms such as probably and likely—[are used] to convey analytical
assessments and judgments. Such statements are not facts, proof, or
knowledge. These assessments and judgments generally are based on
collected information, which often is incomplete or fragmentary. Some
assessments are built on previous judgments. In all cases, assessments and
judgments are not intended to imply that we have ‘proof’ that shows
something to be a factor that definitively links two items or issues.” 186

In other words, judges should take the information they review with a
grain of salt. Mr. Rossmiller advises that when assessing protected
information, courts should: review the information in question; apply
appropriate skepticism; and examine source material. 187 But while Mr.
Rossmiller tells us that the language of much classified information is
inherently “conditional,” and that healthy skepticism is needed when
reviewing it, there is another and surprising countervailing force.
An even healthier dose of judicial skepticism may be necessary to
overcome this force: the secrecy heuristic. A recent study at the University
of Colorado at Boulder offers an additional twist to the overclassification
issue: in matters relating to foreign policy, when people are told a
document is secret, they are statistically more likely to believe its contents
are true.188 The study is based on three different experiments that looked at
secrecy from a citizen, rather than an institutional, point of view.189 The
study found that secret information is weighed more heavily than public
information; secret information is believed to be of higher quality than
public information; and decisions made on the basis of secret information
are judged more favorably than decisions made on the basis of public
information.190 The heuristic fills in for an ability to actually assess the
185. Id. at 1294.
186. Id. at 1314.
187. See id. at 1316–22. There have been instances where courts, outside the FOIA
context, have done this. In Parhat v. Gates, the court found the documents purporting to be
actual evidence that Parhat was an enemy combatant were suffused with so many caveats, that
there was no actual evidence. 532 F.3d 834, 846–47 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Also, in Boumediene
v. Bush, the district court found that despite voluminous evidence preferred by the
government, the status of the defendants as enemy combatants was based on one unsupported
claim from an unnamed source. 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (D.D.C. 2008).
188. Mark Travers, Leaf Van Boven & Charles Judd, The Secrecy Heuristic: Inferring
Quality from Secrecy in Foreign Policy Contexts, 35 POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 97 (2014).
189. Id. at 98.
190. Id. The article speculates that in institutions with cultures of secrecy, such as the

GINSBURG MART - RESUBMITTED (DO NOT DELETE)

201x]

DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE

11/1/2014 11:24 PM

137

target attribute of information: people use secrecy to fill in for quality
when there is, in fact, no difference between the supposedly secret and the
supposedly open information.191 If judges are, like the rest of us, subject to
the secrecy heuristic, they are just as likely to treat claims of secrecy as a
signal of the quality of information.192 If the information is believed more
likely to be true, judges may find it easier to believe the information was
properly classified. Furthermore, since the same agency that produced the
presumptively true information is resisting disclosure, a judge may be more
likely to ascribe veracity to the claim that disclosure would cause harm.
Without training for judges to ignore the heuristic, the secrecy heuristic
would improperly favor an agency’s claim that information is properly
classified, further reducing judicial incentives to actually evaluate whether
or not the information was properly classified.
It has certainly been anecdotally true that judges have failed to use Mr.
Rossmiller’s suggested “grain of salt.” The Sibel Edmonds case provides
an interesting example.193 A federal judge refused to let Sibel Edmonds, the
government translator involved in a whistleblower suit, answer questions
that could not plausibly have had a serious national security implication:
“When and where were you born?,” “Where did you go to school?,” “What
did you focus your studies on in school?,” “Have you met Senate staff
members in any unclassified conferences?”194 The most famous case is, of
course, the case that gave judicial sanction to a state secrets privilege. In
United States v. Reynolds, the government successfully terminated the tort
claim by the widow of a spy plane pilot killed in a plane crash, claiming
that it would have to reveal state secrets about the plane’s spy mechanism
for the case to go forward.195 In 2000, the report the government withheld

CIA, the heuristic may be even more prevalent. Id. at 108.
Id. at 99.
192. Id. at 99.
193. Edmonds v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2006). Although Edmonds
is a state secrets case, the judicial analysis for disclosure or nondisclosure in state secrets cases
applies to FOIA cases. See Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 9, (D.C. Cir. 1978) (analogous
interpretation of the national security exemeption to the FOIA and the states secret privilege).
See also David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of
Information Act, 115 YALE L. J. 628 (2005) (noting that state secrets cases and FOIA
Exemption One cases are “analogous.,”).
194. Anthony Rapa, Comment, When Secrecy Threatens Security: Edmonds v.
Department of Justice and A Proposal to Reform the State Secrets Privilege, 37 SETON HALL
L. REV. 233, 268, n. 279 (2006) (criticizing use of state secrets privilege and increase of
national security within context of Edmonds case).
195. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). Although Reynolds is usually credited as the origin of the states
secret doctrine, Laura Donohue has traced it much further back. See Laura K. Donohue,
The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 82–85 (2010).
191
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was declassified.196 When the report was declassified, Mrs. Reynold’s
daughter sued for fraud, alleging that there were no national security
secrets involved-—just evidence that the plane malfunctioned.197 Every
historian has a list of ludicrous secrets, according to Ted Gup,198 and the
“James Madison Project’s list is as good as any; on it is a Pentagon report
classified ‘top secret’ that criticizes the excessive use of classification in
the military” and a formula for invisible ink for World War I.”199
The dangers of openness and disclosure are frequently exaggerated.200
There were no repercussions from the leak of the Pentagon Papers201 and
the repercussions from the biggest leak of all, Wikileaks, have generally
been more evident in the press’ imagination than in reality.202 The leaks
196. , Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 386 (3 Circ. 2005) See Jess Bravin, High
rd

Court to Consider State Secrets Doctrine, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704029704576088253308626870
(stating that the crash report, later declassified, said negligence caused the crash and did not
contain electronics secrets).
197. Herring v. United States, 2004 WL 20040272 (E.D. Penn. 2004,
198. TED GUP, NATION OF SECRETS: THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY AND THE AMERICAN
WAY OF LIFE 111 (2007) (Explores how and why academic, government, and business
institutions keep secrets from the people).
199.
The
James
Madison
Project’s
Litigation
Files,
at
http://www.jamesmadisonproject.org/litigation.php (accessed on October 3, 2014).
200. Even in an arena where there is strong appeal to the proposition that secrecy is
required, such as the operational details of our nuclear weapon, news reports about classified
safety problems with the United States’ missile program forced the government to implement
crucial safety measures. COMMAND AND CONTROL, supra note 179, at 466–468.
201. “I have never seen any trace of a threat to the national security from the publication.
Indeed, I have never seen it even suggested that there was such an actual threat.” Griswold,
supra note 170.
202. At the time of the leaks by Bradley Manning, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
accused his leak of 250,000 diplomatic cables of “being an attack on the international
community” that “puts people’s lives in danger, threatens our national security and
undermines our efforts to work with other countries to solve shared problems.” Clinton
Condemns Leaks as “Attack on the International Community”, CNN, Nov. 30, 2010,
http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/11/29/wikileaks/. But Clinton also “expressed confidence that
U.S. diplomatic efforts will survive the leak of the documents, whose authenticity she would
not confirm but which lay out in detail the diplomatic sausage-making that is usually hidden
from public view.” Id. Sausage-making is embarrassing, not a danger to the national security.
Amid many claims that the Wikileaks documents caused the death of innocent people, two
claims persisted the longest. One claim regarded the death of Majid Fashi. See Sam Ser, Did
a Wikileaks Document Doom Iranian ‘Massad Agent’?, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL, May 16,
2012, http://www.timesofisrael.com/wikileaks-report-may-have-doomed-iranian-mossad-agent/.
But the story about Majid Fashi was not true. See also Andy Greenberg, Wikileaks: No,
Media ‘Morons,’ We Didn’t Help Iran Execute an Israeli Spy, FORBES, May 16, 2012,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/05/16/wikileaks-no-media-morons-we-didnthelp-iran-execute-an-israeli-spy/. The “Afghan Diaries” allegedly put the security of military
contacts in Afghanistan at risk. See Wikileaks Accused of Murder, CBS EVENING NEWS, Jul.,
29, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/wikileaks-accused-of-murder/ (“Pentagon officials
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have certainty caused spectacular embarrassment, but embarrassment is
specifically excluded as a reason for classification.203 The recent Snowden
leaks have likewise been an embarrassment, and have led to extensive and
difficult conversations at the national and international levels.204 The leaks
have also led to a rash of affirmative releases of previously classified
information by the government and have opened a public debate that even
the current Director of National Intelligence believes is a step in the right
direction.205 In the wake of the leaks, the director of the National
Counterterrorism Center from 2007 to 2011 called for intelligence agencies
to be “‘aggressive’ about reducing classification,” noting that excessive
classification has eroded public trust in the whole secrecy regime. 206 When
President Obama appointed a committee, the President’s Review Group on
Intelligence and Communications Technology, the committee stated that “a
central goal of our recommendations is to increase transparency and to
decrease unnecessary secrecy.”207 The courts have a role to play in making
are accusing the WikiLeaks website and the source of the ‘Afghan Diaries’ of murder for
jeopardizing the security of military contacts in Afghanistan.”). But there has been no proof,
the government has conceded. See, e.g., Nancy A. Youssef, Officials May be Overstating the
Danger
from
WikiLeaks,
MCCLATCHY
NEWSPAPERS,
Nov.
28,
2010,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/11/28/104404/officials-may-be-overstating-the.html
(remarking that despite similar warnings ahead of the previous two massive releases of
classified U.S. intelligence reports by the website, U.S. officials concede that they have no
evidence to date that the documents led to anyone’s death). See also Chase Madar, Accusing
Wikileaks
of
Murder,
THE
NATION,
Jan.
19,
2012,
http://www.thenation.com/article/165758/accusing-wikileaks-murder# (documenting that no
deaths can be traced to the Wikileaks revelations); Mark Hosenball, U.S. Officials Privately
Say
Wikileaks
Damage
Limited,
REUTERS,
Jan.
18,
2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/18/wikileaks-damage-idUSN1816319120110118.
203. See Griswold, supra note __; see also Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707
(Dec. 29, 2009).
204. See Dilanian, supra note 3 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: 2013 Leaks and
Declassifications, Lawfare, OCT. 1, 2013, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/nsa-papers/
(providing a timeline of leaks and declassifications). The response to the Snowden leaks call
to mind the findings of the comments of the joint Committee on Government Operations and
the Committee on the Judiciary. Source Book, supra note 80 at 13 (“In fact, years of study by
this committee show each new administration develops its own special secrecy techniques
which, as time passes, become more and more sophisticated. The factor of credibility,
together with the inclination of the government to invade the privacy of our citizens, poses an
ominous threat to our democratic system which must be opposed at every turn despite the
agony it might create. We believe it is better to have too much freedom than too little.”).
Dilanian, supra note 3. James Clapper, the current Director of National
Intelligence, speaking about the Snowden leaks of information about a FISA court order, said:
“I think it’s clear that some of the conversations this has generated, some of the debate,
actually needed to happen. If there’s a good side to this, maybe that’s it.”
205

206. Steven Aftergood, Declassification as a Confidence-Building Measure, SECRECY
NEWS, December 12, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2013/12/121613.html.
207. THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS
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sure that if the government is indulging in excessive classification, which is
in fact excessive secrecy, , that the government does not get away with it.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
To illuminate how courts have balanced national security and civil
liberties, this article includes an empirical investigation into the
decisionmaking of the federal courts. What circumstances or combination
of circumstances are likely to result in a FOIA requester getting all or some
disputed documents that have been withheld pursuant to the national
security or foreign policy exemption? Are there any lessons in these cases
to help judges overcome their bias? Are there any prescriptive measures
for assuring that overclassification does not preclude rational
decisionmaking and hamper the open debate necessary to democratic
governance?208
We initially chose to look at all of the FOIA cases decided by the trial
and appellate courts in the District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit from 1974 to
2012. To increase the number of appellate cases in the statistical analysis,
we expanded the pool of cases to include all appellate cases in the country.
Focusing special attention on the trial court cases in the District of
Columbia makes some sense in this context. Thirty-eight percent of all
FOIA cases filed from 1979 to 2008 were filed in the District Court for
District of Columbia, according to a recent statistical analysis of the
Federal Judicial Center database.209 The D.C. Circuit has more FOIA
litigation than any other circuit court, deciding 38% of all appellate FOIA
cases nationally.210
TECHNOLOGIES, LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 80 (2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf.
208. To our knowledge, only one other study has taken an empirical look at FOIA cases.
In 2002, Paul R. Verkuil looked at all FOIA cases decided in the 1990s to test whether the de
novo standard of review was being followed by the courts in FOIA cases; de novo review is the
most stringent standard of review, and the author expected reversal rates of close to 50%. See
Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 679, 713 (2002). The actual reversal rate for Exemption 1 cases where Exemption 1 was
the only exemption claimed was 10.8%, and it was 11.3% where Exemption 1 was one of
several exemptions claimed. Id. at 735. Interestingly, the reversal rate was just over 10%
regardless of which exemption was claimed. Id. at 713. This is much more like “committed
to agency discretion.” Id. at 715.
209. Kwoka, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 261. To put the volume of
FOIA cases the D.C. District Court disposes of in perspective, the D.C. Circuit disposes of
only 1.3% of all district Court litigation. Id.
210. Data on file with authors. See also Kwoka, supra note__, at 261; Patricia M. Wald,
“. . . Doctor, Lawyer, Merchant, Chief”, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1147 (1992)
(analyzing the evolution of panel courts’ change and effect on jurisprudence via presidential
appointment).
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A. Data and Analysis
To evaluate the determinants of successful invocation of the national
security exemption, we created a dataset of all reported federal cases in the
D.C. federal courts at the district or appellate level that considered the
exemption, along with all appellate cases.211 This produced a dataset of
270 cases, of which 163 were at the district level and 107 at the appellate
level. For each of these cases, we analyze characteristics of the plaintiff,
the claim itself, the treatment of the claim by the court, and characteristics
of the judge or panel, and, as well as the ultimate outcome of disclosure or
withholding disclosure.
We describe these variables here.
Plaintiff type: For plaintiff type, we examine whether or not the named
plaintiff is a non-governmental organization (NGO) or an individual. We
recognize, of course, that the named plaintiff imperfectly correlates with
the actual party in interest. We also examine whether the plaintiff has been
involved in more than one suit in our database.
Nature of the claim: In terms of the claim itself, we examine whether
Exemption One was invoked on the basis of national security, foreign
affairs, or both. Because FOIA allows the government to claim multiple
exemptions in refusing to disclose certain documents, we also identify any
other exemptions that were invoked in the case. Eighty-five percent of
cases involved another exemption besides Exemption One. The most
commonly invoked was Exemption Three (documents specifically
exempted by other statutes) followed by Seven (law enforcement) and
Exemption Five (privileged internal or inter-agency documents). There
were no cases invoking Exemptions Eight or Nine, which are narrow
exceptions for, respectively, securities and oil and gas.
Other case variables: We also asked whether or not the case included a
Vaughn Index prepared by the agency; whether the judge ordered in
camera review; and whether the judge discussed the sufficiency of the
affidavit.
Judge and panel characteristics: Finally, in terms of judge and panel

211. To identify cases, we conducted searches in the Westlaw and Lexis databases for
Freedom of Information Act cases that mentioned Exemption one or Exemption 1 or the
national security exemption, then manually screened out cases that did not rely on the
relevant exemption. We considered doing a PACER docket search for more unreported
cases, but are not convinced that such a search would be systematic enough to obtain a
reliable sample, or that the time involved in the manual review required would be repaid. We
acknowledge that not all cases are reported in the Lexis and Westlaw databases, and that not
all cases reach the level of a written decision. But the Lexis and Westlaw databases can be
searched using complex Boolean searches and both cover the entire period of our analysis.
Because the number of appellate cases in the D.C. Circuit dataset was relatively small, we
expanded the appellate analysis to include all Circuit Courts of Appeals.
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characteristics, we ask whether the judge was appointed by a Democrat or
Republican. In the case of appellate panels, we identify the composition of
the panel by political party of the appointing president.
Outcome: We coded cases as leading to full disclosure, which is counted
as a victory for the plaintiff; partial disclosure, in which some requested
documents are disclosed; and non-disclosure, which is coded as a victory
for the government. We note whether there was a remand in the decision.
Table 1 provides summary statistics, with appellate panel composition in
Table 3 in the next section. Note the rarity of an outright win by the
plaintiff. Only 5 to 6 percent of all FOIA cases lead to full disclosure.
Trial courts are less likely than appellate courts to grant some form of
disclosure.
Table 1: Summary statistics

Plaintiff
Individual
Characteristics plaintiff
NGO or other
plaintiff
Exception
Foreign
Affairs
exception
National Defense
Exception
Other Exemptions
(all categories)
Exemption 2
Exemption 3
Exemption 4
Exemption 5
Exemption 6
Exemption 7
Treatment by In camera
Court

ALL
CASES
(n=270)

DISTRICT
CASES
ONLY
(n=163)

APPELLATE
CASES
ONLY
(n=107)

.73

.68

.79

.27

.32

.21

.40

.20

.68

.86

.91

.78

.85

.88

.80

.20
.58
.05
.31
.27
.41
.38

.27
.64
.08
.46
.35
.46
.37

.11
.50
.01
.12
.16
.34
.39

GINSBURG MART - RESUBMITTED (DO NOT DELETE)

201x]

11/1/2014 11:24 PM

DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE

Vaughn Index
Sufficiency
of
affidavit discussed
Leg hist discussed
Leg hist discussed
as
basis
for
disclosure
Judge/Panel
Trial
judge
Characteristics party=democrat
Appellate panel
majority or all
democrat
appointee
Outcome
Outcome=govt
wins
Outcome=partial
Outcome=plaintiff
Outcome =2 or 3
(disclosure
or
partial)
Outcome includes
remand

143

.51
.72

.59
.77

.39
.64

.11
.05

.03
.01

.21
.11

.41

.58

.55

N/A

.55

.79

.74

.88

.14
.05
.15

.06
.04
.09

.35
.11
.23

.17

.01

.66

B. District Court Results
To understand the impact of these factors on case outcomes, we
estimated a series of logistic regression models, reported in Table 2.212 The
dependent variable in each model is the case outcome, coded 1 if the
plaintiff secured a full or partial win, and 0 otherwise. We aggregated full
and partial victory because the number of cases in which a plaintiff won the
case outright was very small (6 out of 163 district cases for which an
outcome was identifiable).213 Thus, coefficients with a positive sign
212. Logit regression models are appropriate when the dependent variable—here, the
case outcome—is binary.
213. ( These cases were Center for International Environmental Law v. USTR, 845 F. Supp.
2d 252 (D.D.C. 2012); National Security Archive v. Office of Independent Counsel, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13146; Pratt v. Webster 508 F. Supp. 751 (D.D.C. 1981); Jaffe v. CIA, 573
F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1983). “Win” means that the final document or documents still
contested after negotiations concluded and all motions had been heard were ordered to be
disclosed by the trial court.
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indicate a greater probability of disclosure. Note that several cases fall out
of the analysis because of missing data.
Our first model included only case characteristics. We examine whether
the exemption invoked foreign affairs, and whether there were any other
exemptions claimed in addition to Exemption One. We also examine
whether or not the government prepared a Vaughn Index, whether or not
the court examined the affidavit in camera, and whether or not the case
discusses the sufficiency of the affidavit. The second model adds
characteristics of the party. We examine whether the plaintiff was an NGO
as opposed to an individual (n=58), and whether the plaintiff is found in
more than one of the cases in the dataset (repeat plaintiff) (n=109). Our
hypothesis is that NGOs and repeat plaintiffs will have greater resources to
bring to bear, and will also have better information to select winning
cases.214
The majority of cases in the data are brought against four government
agencies: the CIA (55), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (20), the
Department of State (29) and the Department of Justice (36). We expect
that these repeat defendants will be in a good position to settle cases they
are likely to lose, and hence will have a better “win-rate.” Hence, we
include a dummy variable for cases in which the Government defendant is
an agency other than those four (n=60). We predict this variable will be
associated with greater likelihood of plaintiff victory. Of course, many of
the Department of Justice cases will in fact involve a defendant that is
another government agency.
Our third model includes, in addition to the other variables discussed so
far, a dummy variable indicating whether or not the trial judge was
appointed by a Democrat. A large volume of literature in political science
and law demonstrates that ideology—typically as measured by the party of
the appointing president—has significant explanatory power as a
determinant of judicial behavior.215 We thus investigate the effect of the
appointing party.

214. Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come out Ahead, 9 L. SOC. REV. 95, 98–101(1974)
(showing that repeat players have structural advantages in the legal system).
215. JEFFREY A. SEGAL AND HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 233–34 (1993). But see LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM LANDES &
RICHARD POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF RATIONAL CHOICE 27–28 (2013) (providing more nuanced analysis showing that
party influence is not consistent across types of cases and level of court).
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Table 2: Logit Regression Models
District Court
Independent Variables
(1)
Case
characteristics
Foreign affairs prong
-.01*
(.69)

145

Predicting Disclosure Order by
(2)
Case + Party
characteristics
.19
(0.73)

(3)
Case, Party and
characteristics
0.31
(0.73)

Other exemption claimed

-1.63
(0.94)

-.20
(0.88)

-0..13
(0.89)

In camera review

0.63
(0.87)

0.63
(0.59)

0.65
(0.59)

Vaughn Index

0.55
(0.92)

0.54
(0.63)

0.56
(0.64)

Sufficiency of affidavit discussed

0.59
(0.63)

0.13
(0.70)

0.20
(0.71)

NGO plaintiff

0.22
(0.65)

0.28
(0.64)

Repeat plaintiff

0.74
(0.67)

-0.74
(0.66)

Defendant=Other

1.17*
(0.62)

1.28**
(0.64)

Trial Judge=Democratic Appointee

0.55
(0.64)

Constant

Observations

-2.73***
(0.94)

159
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-3.85***
(1.26)

-4.43***
(1.47)

158

158

The results indicate that most of the case do not produce significant
results. The most consistent predictor of whether or not the court will order
disclosure is the identity of the defendant. When the defendant is an agency

Judge
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other than the most common targets, disclosure is more likely. Political
party affiliation of the judge does not make a difference.
C. Appellate Results
We continue the analysis by running the same model described above on
the appellate cases for all circuits. We include all variables described above
as well as additional variables to capture whether the panel has a majority
of judges appointed by Democratic presidents (DEMAPP) and a dummy
variable for cases in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals (DC). Our findings
are somewhat similar to the District Court results, in that plaintiff
characteristics are strong predictors of success. We observe that repeat
plaintiffs have an advantage, and “other” defendants (who can be presumed
to have less experience) have a disadvantage at the appellate level. In
addition, cases involving in camera review by are associated with higher
levels of disclosure. Interestingly, the foreign affairs prong of Exemption
One is associated with more disclosure in one model, though the result is
not consistent.
Table 3: Logit Regression Models Predicting Disclosure Order by
Appellate Court
(1)

(2)

(3)

Foreign affairs prong

0.96
(0.63)

1.757**
(0.80)

-13.65
(1,322)

Other exemption claimed

-0.10
(0.66)

-0.32
(0.740)

-0.53
(0.79)

In camera review

0.48
(0.52)

1.21*
(0.62)

1.17*
(0.67)

Vaughn Index

0.60
(0.51)

0.69
(0.56)

1.04*
(0.62)

Sufficiency of affidavit discussed

0.18
(0.56)

-0.19
(0.620)

-0.15
(0.669)

-0.75

-0.95

Independent Variables

NGO plaintiff
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(0.84)

(0.99)

Repeat plaintiff

1.94**
(0.78)

2.54***
(0.96)

Defendant=Other

1.24**
(0.55)

1.13*
(0.59)

Majority of Panel
Appointees App

Democratic

0.41
(0.56)

DC Circuit

-16.22
(1,322)

Constant

-2.459***
(0.79)

-4.22***
(1.09)

11.26
(1,322)

Observations

105

105

105

While the pooled results for all circuits show no special propensity for
the D.C. Circuit to support the government, our data presents some
intriguing findings when we examine party differences. Perhaps the most
interesting outcome is associated with panel composition, presented in the
two panels of Table 3. As noted, we distinguish between panels in which
all judges are appointed by Democrats, Republicans, or if the panel is
mixed. Party composition has played an important role in recent
understandings of judicial behavior, and our evidence is partly consistent
with this literature.216 Of the four cases in which the DC Circuit granted
disclosure, three were decided by panels that included two Democratic

216. See, e.g., Thomas Miles & Cass Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761–62 (2008) (looking at panel composition in administrative law); Adam
B. Cox and Thomas Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting Rights Act
Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV 1493–94 (2008) (effects of panel composition in Voting
Rights Act cases); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Trading Votes for Reasoning: Covering
in Judicial Opinions, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 739 (2008) (reviewing research on judicial voting
in panels); FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 176–77
(2007) (analyzing influence of appointing president on circuit court decisions); Jonathan P.
Kastellec, Panel Composition and Judicial Compliance on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 23 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 421, 422 n.2 (2007) (integrating studies on judicial compliance, panel
decisionmaking, and case selection).
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appointees, and three Democratic appointees decided one of the cases. 217
In other words, panels of the D.C. Circuit composed of a majority of
Republican appointees have never granted disclosure when Exemption One
is invoked.218 While this is perhaps not surprising, it is an interesting and
important result, and contrasts with the results reported above for District
cases in which party affiliation made no difference.
At the same time, the broader sample of appellate cases does not exhibit
the same pattern. Looking at Table 3b, we see that the D.C. Circuit pattern
is not replicated in the other circuits. Indeed, in other circuits, allRepublican panels appear to be more likely to side with the plaintiff. And
in general, the D.C. Circuit appears particularly deferential toward
government. To be sure, the multivariate results suggest that this is largely
explained by case characteristics and party type. Still, the suggestion that
party status may matter in one court is consistent with recent scholarship
that finds that the influence of ideology increases at higher levels of the
federal bench.219 We have also identified an important difference among
appellate circuits, in which the D.C. Circuit behaves differently from
others. This finding is consistent with notions of specialization, but also
may reflect excessive deference by a court that plays a central role in the
modern administrative state.
Table 3a: Panel composition summary: DC Circuit Only
Appointing President
# cases (%)
# P wins* (%)
All Republican
5 (.14)
0 (.00)
2 Republican 1
10 (.28)
0 (.00)
Democratic
2 Democratic 1
15 (.39)
3 (.20)
Republican
All Democratic
7 (.19)
1 (.14)
TOTAL
37
4

217. McGehee v. CIA, 697 F.2d 1095, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (two Democrat panel,
finding that agencies bear the burden of proof, under reasonableness standards); Schaffer v.
Kissinger, 505 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (2 Democrat panel, giving burden of proof to
government agency, as well as giving plaintiff right to limited discovery); Allen v. CIA, 636
F.2d 1287, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (three Democrat panel allowing for partial disclosure and
prohibiting conclusory affidavits as sufficient proof of meeting a FOIA exemption); Founding
Church of Scientology, Inc. v. Bell, 603 F.2d 945, 949–50 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (two Democrat
panel defining a more limited understanding of FOIA exemptions by analyzing legislative
intent and requiring more than substantial compliance on the government’s behalf).
218. A t-test for difference in means indicates the difference (t=-1.53) is just shy of
significant at the 10% confidence level. Pr(T < t) = 0.06.
219. See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 215, at 27-28.
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Table 3b: Panel composition summary: All Circuits besides DC220
# cases
# P wins*(%)
All Republican
10 (.14)
4 (.40)
2
Republican
1 23 (.33)
7 (.30)
Democratic
2
Democratic
1 24 (.34)
4 (.17)
Republican
All Democratic
13 (.19)
5 (.38)
TOTAL
70
20

D. Summary and Discussion
To summarize our findings, full or partial disclosure in FOIA cases in
which the Government invokes Exemption One is relatively rare, and it
occurs in only around a small percentage of cases that go to trial. Case
characteristics and trial judge characteristics are not important determinants
of outcomes at the trial level, but the former do seem to matter somewhat at
the appellate level, where experience seems to predict success. In addition,
we have suggested that while politics does not seem to make a difference at
the appellate level, the D.C. Circuit may be an exception in this regard, in
that Democratic-dominated panels are more likely to order or affirm
disclosure than are those with majority of Republican-appointees there.
This is generally consistent with the observation that panel effects are
strong at the appellate courts.221
Our single most consistent finding is that repeat players seem to have an
advantage in FOIA litigation. This is consistent with a long literature that
emphasizes the informational advantage of repeat players in various
litigation contexts.222 Repeat players can choose which cases to bring, and
can also exploit their superior knowledge to select cases to settle.223
Presumably, in the context of FOIA Exemption One, experienced
These case were distributed as follows: 1st Circuit–6 cases; 2d Circuit–14 cases; 3d Circuit–7
cases; 4th Circuit–3 cases; 5th Circuit–5 cases; 6th Circuit–2 cases; 7th Circuit–4 cases; 8th
Circuit–2 cases; 9th Circuit–20 cases; 10th Circuit–1 case; 11th Circuit–5 cases; Federal
Circuit–1 case.
221. See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 215, at ch. 4, 153–54. Note that the
Epstein et al. book does not include an analysis of FOIA cases specifically.
Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOCY. REV. 95, 97-114 (1974) (identifying advantages repeat players
in litigation).
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
Legal Stud. 1, 3 (1984) (proposing a settlement model); Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go
to Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE WESTERN L. REV.
315, 337 n. 105 (1999) (repeat players in tax litigation).
222

223
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defendants know what arguments are likely to convince judges that genuine
national security interests are at stake, know how to construct a Vaughn
Index, and know how to manage the disclosure process. Experienced
plaintiffs, on the other hand, know what cases to push and what to settle,
and so may be able to prevail on disclosure claims that go all the way to
trial.
V. THE CONFLUENCE OF TWO NARRATIVES
The growth of the national security state from the post-World War II era
to the post-9/11 era has been well-documented.224 The very concept of a
war on terror means that the United States can continually exist in what
Georgio Agamben calls the “state of exception,” where legitimate
governments expand their powers and suspend the rule of law in response
to emergencies.225 Those powers are meant to end when the emergency is
over, or the appropriate government actors have ratified steps taken to
respond to an emergency.226 Agamben identified the actions taken by
President Bush after September 11th – what we have come to call the “war
on terror” - as an example of a continuing state of exception.227 When
attack is imminent, as it must be in a “war,” cognitive psychology tells us
that humans favor overestimation of risks, further tilting decisionmaking
towards national security secrecy and against civil liberties and access.228
A balancing act between secrecy and disclosure has been a hallmark of
American history, but it has not always been tilted so strongly toward
secrecy. The trend has been long and gradual. The Constitutional
Convention was held in secret, but even in the first days of the new
republic, the populace relied on patriots and the press to for disclosure.229
224. See, e.g., David Jablonsky, The State of the National Security State, PARAMETERS 4
(Winter
2002-2003),
available
at
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/02winter/jablonsk.pdf
[last
accessed October 5, 2014]
225. STATE OF EXCEPTION, supra note __, at 2–6.
226. See, e.g., id. at 12-16, 20-21 (providing an example of a state of exception in the
United States that lasted for ten weeks, during which President Lincoln functioned as an
“absolute dictator” by decreeing that an army should be raised and convening a special session
of Congress—acts which were later ratified by Congress).
227. Id. at 3 (illustrating the state of exception by the military order President Bush
issued on November 13, 2001, authorizing the indefinite detention of noncitizens suspected
of involvement in terrorist activities, without providing those detainees the status of persons
charged with a crime under U.S. law, or the status of POWs as defined by the Geneva
Convention).
228. OREN GROSS, SECURITY V. LIBERTY: ON EMOTIONS AND COGNITION, IN THE
CHANGED THE LAW 45, 47–50, 53 (David Jenkins, Anders Henriksen & Amanda
Jacobsen eds., 2014) .
229. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 332–34(1973)
LONG

DECADE: HOW 9/11 HAS

GINSBURG MART - RESUBMITTED (DO NOT DELETE)

201x]

DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE

11/1/2014 11:24 PM

151

One measure of the trend comes from the Department of State’s publication
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), which has published
diplomatic dispatches since 1861.230 The first volumes actually contain
contemporaneous dispatches; until the end of the century FRUS published
dispatches that were only a few months old.231 Originally, the State
Department originally did not really keep secrets, but as the national
security state has expanded, so has the amount of time that dispatches
remained secret.232 In 2013, the first volume of dispatches from the Carter
Administration (1977-1981) was published, over thirty years after Carter
left office.233
The nature of classification orders has changed over the decades. There
was not a formal executive policy on classification until an order
establishing a military classification system was signed by Franklin D.
Roosevelt in 1940.234 Then, in 1950, Truman issued a new Executive
Order for military secrets235 and another in 1951 that, for the first time,
(discussing the popular sentiment against government secrecy during the early years of U.S.
independence, as well as the relatively unchecked power of the press to disclose government
secrets at that time).
230. See generally About the Foreign Relations of the United States Series U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
OFFICE
OF
THE
HISTORIAN
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/about-frus (last visited Aug. 29, 2014) (the
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series is the official documentary historical
record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions that have been declassified and edited for
publication, beginning with the Lincoln Administration).
231. THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra, note 229 at 336.
232. Id. (quoting John Bassett Moore, once the Assistant Secretary of State, who said that
“the State Department before the First World War had no secrets whatever, except for
personnel reports”).
233. There is a new history of the FRUS by the Department of State, documenting the
clash between secrecy and disclosure; the conclusion the Department of State comes to is that
secrecy is more of a problem than disclosure. See William B. McAllister & Joshua Botts,
Conclusion to William B. McAllister, Joshua Botts, Peter Cozzens & Aaron W. Marrs,
Toward “Thorough, Accurate, and Reliable”: A History of the Foreign Relations of the
United States Series, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (preview
edition, Jan. 23, 2014), http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus-history. (“The
historical evidence this book presents indicates that the most significant negative repercussions
attributable to the FRUS series have not involved damaging releases of potentially-sensitive
national security or intelligence information. Rather, the reputation of the U.S. Government
has suffered primarily from failures of the series to document significant historical events or
acknowledge past actions. FRUS realizes its promise when it fulfills global expectations for
openness that promote democracy and encourage [human] freedom.”).
234. Exec. Order No. 8,381, 5 Fed. Reg. 1147 (Mar. 26, 1940). John Woolley &
Gerhard Peters, Defining Certain Vital Military and Naval Installations and Equipment, THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=75574 (last visited
Sept. 1, 2014).
235. Exec. Order No. 10,104, 15 Fed. Reg. 595, 597-98 (Feb. 3, 1950), available at John
Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Defining Certain Vital Military and Naval Installations and

Equipment as Requiring Protection Against the General Dissemination of Information
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allowed any department or agency to classify information when it seemed
“necessary in the interest of national security.“236 In 1955, Eisenhower
replaced it with Executive Order 10501.237 This changed the classification
standard from “national security” to “national defense” and cut back on the
number of agencies that could be classified.238 These executive orders
created entrenched security bureaucracies and the executive branch has
never looked back.239 Congress started studying overclassification,240 but
has not been able to eliminate or even reduce the problem, which is deeply
rooted in the culture and incentive structure of the bureaucracy.
There have been arguments made whenever there is a national
emergency of some kind–whether we are fighting communism or fascism
or waging war on terrorism–that the nature of the risks involved requires
the country to set aside the checks and balances of the Constitution.241 The
argument is that whatever is happening now is so extraordinary that the
founders could not possibly have imagined emergencies of such
magnitude.242 But this argument “over-looks the profound historical fact
that the Founders fashioned the Constitution with its unique checks and
balances at a time when the incipient American republic was in the greatest
danger of any in its long future existence.”243
The exigency argument has been made, successfully, and courts have
Relative

Thereto,
THE
AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59321 (last visited Sept. 1, 2014).
236. Exec. Order No. 10, 290, 16 Fed. Reg. 9795, 9797-98 (Sept. 27, 1951), available at
John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Prescribing Regulations Establishing Minimum Standards
for the Classification, Transmission, and Handling, by Departments and Agencies of the
Executive Branch, of Official Information Which Requires Safeguarding in the Interest of the
Security of the United States, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=78426 (last visited Sept. 1, 2014).
237. Exec. Order No. 10,501, 18 F.R. 7049, 7051, 7054 (1953), available at John
Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Safeguarding Official Information in the Interests of the Defense
of
the
United
States,
THE
AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=485 (last visited Sept. 1, 2014).
238. Id.
239. THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 229, at 340.
240. William G. Phillips, The Government’s Classification System, in NONE OF YOUR
BUSINESS: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN AMERICA 61, 66 (Norman Dorsen & Stephen Gillers
eds., 1974) (noting that the Defense Department’s Coolidge Committee and the Commission
of Government Security (Wright Commission) were two of the earliest groups established to
study classification procedures).
Geoffrey R. Stone, National Security v. Civil Liberties, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2203,
2203–08 (2007) (discussing judicial decisions limiting civil liberties that were later
acknowledged to have been unjustly decided in the interest of national security)
242. Gary Hart, Liberty and Security, in US NATIONAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE AND
DEMOCRACY: FROM THE CHURCH COMMITTEE TO THE WAR ON TERROR 13 (Russell A.
Miller ed., 2008).
241

243

Id.
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approved violations of civil liberty that, in hindsight, were clearly
unnecessary; those decisions are a blot on American history.244 Cases
brought under the Espionage Act of 1917245 and the Sedition Act of 1918246
were upheld, but after the war, every convicted person received amnesty. 247
Korematsu v. United States248 is the paradigmatic example of a bad law
upheld for the wrong reasons249. Since the Vietnam era, the Supreme Court
has been more willing to challenge executive claims; the courts have
replaced “the ‘logical’ presumption” of deference “with the ‘pragmatic’
presumption
of
close
judicial
scrutiny.”250
The increased Supreme Court scrutiny started in the 1970s with the
Pentagon Papers,251 but has not trickled down to the lower courts, the
gatekeepers for FOIA requests.252 The range of matters covered by
“national security” keeps expanding. In the four epochs of national
security that Laura Donohue has identified,253 our era is characterized by a
move towards using national security claims to balance competing risks..254
244. See National Security v. Civil Liberties,supra, note 245.
245. 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (prohibiting interference with military recruitment, support of
national enemies during wartime, or insubordination in the military).
246. 40 Stat. 553 (1918) (extending the Espionage Act to limit certain civil liberties—
especially speech).
247. National Security v. Civil Liberties, supra note 232, at 2205; see also GEOFFREY R.
STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO
THE WAR ON TERRORISM 230-32 (2004) (detailing the efforts made over many years to secure
the release of those convicted under the Espionage and Sedition Acts).
248. 323 U.S. 214, 215–16, 223–24 (1944) (justifying violation of civil liberties in the
context of Japanese internment camps).
249 National Security v. Civil Liberties, supra note 245, at 2212 (explaining that while a
presumption of deference to executive and military officials during wartime may be logical in
theory because judges have little national security experience, this deference will fail in
practice because it precludes those making judgments from properly taking the relevant
factors into account in a fair and reasonable way).
250. Id..
251. Id. at 2210–2211; see also Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary is a They, Not an It:
Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549,
562 (2005) (stating that lower courts can choose to defy the Supreme Court’s instructions and
that there is no real penalty for lower courts’ non-compliance).
252 The Freedom of Information Act Trial, supra note 13 at 221. (Because bringing a FOIA
case in federal court is the primary legal tool to challenge the government’s right to keep
secret its operations, the robustness of our democracy rests, at least in part, on the
robustness of the FOIA litigation process itself.)
253. Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573,
1573–1574 (2011) (The four epochs are: “protecting the union (1776-1898)”; “formative
international engagement and domestic power (1889-1930)”; “the ascendance of national
security (1930-1989)”; and “balancing risk (1989-2012)”).
254. Id. at 1589 (risks include “climate change, pandemic disease, drugs, and organized
crime . . . national security persists in its position of dominance, constantly expanding to
envelop other issues.”). See also Bridget Rose Nolan, Information Sharing and Collaboration

in the United States Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study of the National

GINSBURG MART - RESUBMITTED (DO NOT DELETE)

154

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

11/1/2014 11:24 PM

[XX:N

As a result, in the realm of FOIA requests, judicial compliance with the
congressionally mandated standard of review is even more important.
There are not many tools utilized by the FOIA courts to perform their
functions of review—referees, experts, and masters have not been utilized
and discovery is not normally available255—but the FOIA courts do have
one tool they have crafted to help make decisions: the Vaughn Index.256 As
we have seen from the empirical study, the presence of a Vaughn Index in
FOIA litigation is the one indicator that requesters might get documents.257
Prior to the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Vaughn v. Rosen, the FOIA
provided no mechanism for government agencies to justify and substantiate
their documentary withholdings. Thus, plaintiffs seeking disclosure of
government documents often received little to no information regarding the
reason why documents were not released. Moreover, courts were hindered
in their ability to assess the merits of FOIA withholdings. In Vaughn, the
court declined to accept the United States Civil Service Commission’s
affidavit affirming that certain documents requested by the plaintiff were
subject to exemption because it found that the agency’s assertions were
conclusory and generalized. Instead, the court required the agency to
provide an itemized list of withheld documents, complete with crossreferenced explanations of statutory exemptions for each withholding. This
item is known as a “Vaughn Index.” As the Vaughn court explained, the
requirements set forth by the court serve two main purposes: (1) to ensure
“part[ies’] right to information” and (2) to allow “the court system
effectively and efficiently to evaluate the factual nature of disputed
Counterterrorism Center 158 (2013) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania),
available at http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nolan-nctc.pdf (last accessed September 7, 2014)
(There are those who part of the problem with the current security state is the sheer size of
the security bureaucracy; “For the analysts, this would address the hindrances that come along
with a bloated bureaucracy,”. . . “It would also help with what they perceived to be excessive
redundancy, as opposed to a lower level of redundancy which was deemed necessary for
safety and accuracy reasons.”); see also Robert Steele, Steven Aftergood: To Fix US
Intelligence, Shrink It?,
PUBLIC INTELLIGENCE BLOG, Sept. 30, 2013,
http://www.phibetaiota.net/2013/09/steve-aftergood-to-fix-us-intelligence-shrink-it/
(last
accessed Sept. 7, 2014) (This dissertation “gives voice to intelligence analysts who are
overwhelmed by information, flustered by competitive pressures from their home agencies,
and weighed down by dubious security policies”). But see Charles Nemfakos et al.,
WORKFORCE PLANNING IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A RETROSPECTIVE, 2013,
available
at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR114/RAND_RR114
.pdf (discussing a contrary view).
255. Kwoka, The Freedom of Information Act Trial, supra note 13, at 235 (noting that
discovery is very rare in FOIA litigation); see also Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 828 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
256 See supra n. 22.
257. See supra Table 3 and preceding text.
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information.”258
There are many justifications for openness and transparency in
government. The justifications emphasize the role of openness in curbing
fraud, corruption and despotism,259 the role of openness in curing social
and industrial diseases,260 and the role of openness in informed and
enlightened government decisionmaking.261 Another benefit of openness is
preventing new attacks. As the 9/11 Commission found, more publicity
could have prevented 9/11.262 There is the more modern justification that
citizens are entitled to timely and useful information from their government
to enable citizen decisionmaking in our complex modern world.263 But
there is a surprising benefit of allowing only proper and limited
classification of national security information: trust in the government. In
the now classic book Secrecy, Daniel Moynihan argues compellingly that
the climate of secrecy engendered by Cold War politics created such an
atmosphere of political distrust that people did not believe the government

258 Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
259. See, e.g., THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT IN CURBING CORRUPTION 252–54 (Rick
Stapenhurst, Niall Johnston & Riccardo Pelizzo eds., 2006) (examining the role of
parliament’s “culture of . . . openness and accountability” in preventing government abuses of
power).
260. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT
92 (1914) (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants . . . .”).
261. Daniel Moynihan, Secrecy: How America Blew It, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 1990, at
14 (discussing the long-kept secret of the Cold War, that American analysts consistently
inflated the Soviet economy’s ability and rate of growth, leading to decades of American overspending in an effort to catch up to this imaginary Soviet economy). All of these
miscalculations were secret and were based on secret evidence. Id. Moynihan himself had, in
the 1970s, pointed out the visible flaws in the American analysis of the Soviet economy. Id.
262. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 43, 476 (2004). The only instance
cited by the 9/11 Commission that might have prevented the attacks was a statement by the
terrorists’ paymaster that had they known that Zacarias Moussaoui had been arrested at a
flight school in Minnesota, bin Laden would have called off the attacks. Id. The 9/11
Commission concluded that only “publicity” could have “derailed the plot.” Id. at 276.
Other beneficial examples of open access include the capture of the Unabomber only after
the New York Times reluctantly agreed to publish the Manifesto. JENNIFER DARYL SLACK
AND JOHN MACGREGOR VISE, CULTURE + TECHNOLOGY: A PRIMER 2005 84; This Day in
History: Sep. 19, 1995: Unabomber Manifesto Published, http://www.history.com/this-day-inhistory/unabomber-manifesto-published (last accessed Sept. 7, 2014). The Washington
sniper was apprehended only after a license plate number, kept secret by law enforcement,
was leaked to the press. Emerging Threats: Overclassification and Pseudo-Classification:
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Security, Emerging Threats, & Int’l Relations of the
Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. at 5–6 (Mar. 2, 2005) (statement of Thomas S.
Blanton, National Security Archive).
263. ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF
TRANSPARENCY 5–7 (2007) (examining incomplete disclosure that is irrelevant to consumers).
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even when the government was telling the truth.264
Proponents of transparency emphasize the role of openness in curbing
fraud, corruption and despotism,265 the role of openness as the cure for
social and industrial diseases,266 and the role of openness in informed and
enlightened government decisionmaking.267
There are, of course,
arguments against openness. The belief that transparency is a complete
good, or that it always leads to the best decisionmaking, has its critics.268
And there is the undeniable fact that some modicum of information must be
kept secret. But in the context of a FOIA request, the benefits of
transparency are meant to be weighed against the costs of publicity. Courts
have been assigned this task of balancing secrecy and national security, but
they have generally declined to play it.
There are two powerful narratives at play in the context of the national
security exemption to the FOIA. On the one hand, there is the rise of the
national security state from the end of World War II to the present. The
theme underlying this state has always been: there are enemies we must
combat, and we need the tools to do so.269 And it is in fact true that there
264. DANIEL MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 52–58 (1998)
(Recounts history of secrecy as a tool for the American government). There are, of course,
arguments against transparency in high-level government decisionmaking.
265. See, e.g., Rick Stapenhurst, Niall Johnston & Riccardo Pelizzo, eds., supra note 24,
at 252-253 (2006).
266. “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants. . .” BRANDEIS, supra note 24, at 92.
267. Daniel Moynihan, Secrecy: How America Blew It, supra note 24, at 14, discussing
the long-kept secret of the Cold War, that American analysts consistently inflated the Soviet
economy’s ability and rate of growth, leading to decades of American over-spending in an
effort to catch up to this imaginary Soviet economy. All of these miscalculations were secret
and were based on secret evidence. Id. Moynihan himself had, in the 1970s, pointed out the
visible flaws in the American analysis of the Soviet economy. Id.
268. See, e.g., Justin Fox and Richard Van Weelden, Costly Transparency, 96 J. OF PUB.
ECON. 142 (2012) (when individuals delegate authority to experts, transparency does not
always improve the expert’s actions; “observing the consequences of the expert’s actions can
be socially harmful in many economically relevant environments”). The article describes the
situation a legislator faces who must choose whether or not to approve an executive’s
proposal, for example, to authorize the Bush administration to go to war against Iraq; if a
Senator had weak information that there were no weapons of mass destruction, she would be
more likely to oppose the war if there was no chance of finding out if in fact there were any
weapons of mass destruction. Id. at 143. If the cost of an unjustified war was really high,
voting against the war would have been in voter’s interest. Id. Fear of the results actually
becoming known militates against voting against the war. Id.
269. A recent study suggests that, in the event of an actual attack, large or small, the
American people would be willing to lose constitutionally protected liberties and the national
security community would also support constitutional infringement without changing existing
laws, but that courts would “encourage new laws and acts.” See Robin L. Schwartz, Predicting
the Loss of Constitutional Rights and Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security,
Capstone
Study,
American
Military
University,
Aug.
10,
2010,
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are enemies of the United States. But as the enemies have become more
diffuse, the tools the government uses have become both more
sophisticated and more invasive. The level of spying on American citizens
that has been uncovered by the Snowden releases of “classified information
has caused a lot of controversy and generated a heated discussion about the
balance of power between citizens and the government.” 270 On the other
hand, there is seemingly unanimous agreement that too much information
is classified; the differences in opinion are about the percentage of
documents that are overclassified, not the fact of overclassification.
The courts should act as a corrective. The courts should follow the
directives they were given in the revisions to the FOIA in 1974 often
enough that those who routinely classify documents that could in fact be
part of the public conversation think before they classify: is this going to
pass muster? Since there are so few courts that challenge the government’s
assertions that releasing a particular document will damage national
security, there is no reason to withhold the classification stamp. In the
wake of the Wikileaks and Snowden leaks, we have James Clapper telling
us that the leaks started an important public debate.271 His comment
referred specifically to the leak of a classified FISA court order; that
classification prevented a necessary public debate, and the order should not
have been classified. In fact, the FISA Court recently issued an order
stating that all FISA court orders would be reviewed and released as
appropriate.272 These acknowledgements and concessions are not possible
without concluding that the orders were originally overclassified.273
When reviewing the denial of a FOIA request, all Article III judges are
competent to balance national security and the public interest; nothing in
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1677496 (last accessed September 7, 2014). The report’s ultimate
conclusion is that laws eroding currently constitutionally protected rights would be approved
by courts in the event of a large scale domestic attack. Id. at 3, 7.
270. The NSA Files, THE GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/world/the-nsa-files
(collecting all of the Guardians’ stories on Snowden’s leaks regarding NSA surveillance)(last
accessed September 7, 2014).
271. Dilanian, supra note 3. James Clapper, the current Director of National
Intelligence, speaking about the Snowden leaks of information about a FISA court order, said:
“I think it’s clear that some of the conversations this has generated, some of the debate,
actually needed to happen. If there’s a good side to this, maybe that’s it.” This is not to say
that the Snowden leaks have not changed the landscape for U.S. foreign relations or national
security, and made many conversations with both allies and enemies more difficult. This is
not the same, however, as damage to the national security. Id.
272. In Re Orders of This Court Interpreting Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, Docket
No. Misc. 13-02, United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Sept. 13, 2013,
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2013/09/fisc-091313.pdf (last accessed Sept. 7, 2014).
273. Not “improperly” classified, but classified when not classifying the information
would not have harmed national security. See comments on Dubin v. United States supra,
note 11
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such a review requires or is likely to lead to rubber stamping the release of
documents. We started our analysis with a foreign affairs Exemption One
case where, at least so far, the document requested has been ordered
released, even though the district court never saw the document. There was
a Vaughn Index ordered in CIEL I.274
We end with another case that has generated lots of headlines,
International Counsel Bureau v. U.S. Department of Defense.275 In ICB v.
DOD I, the district court held the government’s declarations to a standard
of specificity and adequacy.276 The plaintiffs sought records about four
individuals detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Air Base. The first
FOIA request was for medical records for two detainees; the second FOIA
request sought video, photographic and other recorded documents about
four named detainees. The Department of Justice submitted a Vaughn
Index and two declarations, and moved for summary judgment as to the
adequacy of its search and its inability to segregate non-exempt material
from exempt material, as well as the propriety of its four claimed
exemptions, as to the fifty-nine photographs, forty-five videos and one
audiotape it had identified. Regarding the government’s Vaughn Index,
Judge John D. Bates said “[t]his court cannot fairly assess the propriety of
the exemption claims because there is a dearth of ‘reasonably specific
detail’ about how the exemptions apply to the documents as a whole.”277
The Department of Defense was ordered to “conduct a new search of the
records of the Defense Department and its components for documents
responsive to plaintiffs’ FOIA request.”278 After the Department’s
response, the parties again cross-filed for summary judgment.279
This time around, the government’s search was found adequate, but the
all of the claims of exemption were not.280 Although the government’s
declarations established that at least some portions of the video recordings
were properly withheld under exemption one, the same was not true for the
remaining audio recording. To justify withholding this recording, the
government offers only the conclusory statements that “releasing it would
risk disclosing intelligence sources and methods, causing harm to national
security” and that “it contains information concerning that [sic] might
identify intelligence sources and methods, and information that, if released,
274. CIEL I, supra note 16, at 154.
275. International Counsel Bureau v. U.S. Department of Defense (ICB v. DOD I), 657
F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2009).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 42.
278. Id. at 43.
279. International Counsel Bureau v. U.S. Department of Defense (ICB v. DOD II),
723 F. Supp 2d 54, 55 (D.D.C. 2010).
280. Id. at 60–64.
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can cause damage to national security.”281 The court found this insufficient
and sent the government back to try one last time.
Back for the third time, the government tried again.282 The court found
the government’s attempts to subdivide the recordings into severable parts
“‘cross-referenced to the relevant portion of the claimed
exemption.’ False inconsistent and confusing.”283
The government’s
“Vaughn indices and declarations also provide no illumination as to the
actual lengths of the video, when certain segments begin and end, or how
long such subdivided segments run.”284 The court ordered the government
to produce three representative videotapes for the Court’s in camera
review.285 The government complied, and, despite the court’s previous
statement that it would not give the government another chance,286 accepted
new declarations.287 And found the new declarations plausible: “In any
event,
these
additional
declarations,
providing
plausible
explanations of the harm to national security from the release of even solo
images of a detainee, and explanations for why the videos were
appropriately classified in their entirety, ‘merit substantial weight.’”288
The plaintiffs did not get the documents they requested. It is open to
debate whether the government should get so many attempts to justify
withholding documents before they hit on one that resonates,289 but Judge
Bates did make the government do what it is supposed to do: link specific
harm to a specific disclosure, and that is a good sign. However painful the
process, the government needed to justify its rationale for withholding the
requested documents in a meaningful way, and holding the government to
that standard is what the FOIA was intended to require.

281. Id. at 64.
282. International Counsel Bureau v. U.S. Department of Defense (ICB v. DOD III),
864 F. Supp. 2d 101 (D.D.C. 2010).
283. Id. at 105.
284. Id. at 106.
285. Id. at 110. Compare this to the one case where the court appointed a referee, in a
FOIA lawsuit, In re United States Department of Defense, supra note 97, at 242, in which the
district court did not trust the government to be impartial in its choices. See Wald, Some
Exceptional Condition, supra note 97, at 408.
286. ICB v. DOD II, supra note 216, at 65: “The Court repeats that the Department is
now being given a third opportunity to justify withholding these recordings; the Court will not
offer it a fourth.”
287. ICB v. DOD IV, supra note 17.
288. Id.
289. This was also a problem in CIEL. See discussion in Part II, supra at 6. It is
particularly troubling when the government does not raise the national security exemption
until all other efforts have failed.
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CONCLUSION
In light of the overwhelming evidence that agencies routinely
overclassify documents, courts can play an important role in breaking into
that routine by taking seriously their obligation to perform de novo and in
camera review of documents agencies claim are exempt under the first
exemption to the FOIA and by asking for the assistance of experts in
analyzing these claims. As the ICB v. DOD case demonstrates, holding the
government to the standards required by the FOIA does not result in
rubber-stamping the production of documents.
Some method of
streamlining the review process would certainly reduce the costs of getting
information to the public, both for the government and for the currently
very limited class of plaintiffs who can afford to take contested requests
through the existing process. The result would be a better balance between
transparency and national security than currently exists.
Since
overclassification is in its own way an effort to “curb open public
discussion of vital public issues,”290 courts that hold the government to the
exacting standard required by the FOIA are protecting that open debate.
This is not a role the courts should knowingly shirk.

290. See, e.g., David C. Vladeck, Litigating National Security Cases in the Aftermath of
9/11, 2 J. OF NAT’L SECURITY L. AND POL’Y 165, 193 (2006). See also Dilanian, supra note 3
(discussing Clapper’s view of classification).
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